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MARRIAGE LAW AND FAMILY LAW:
AUTONOMY, INTERDEPENDENCE, AND
COUPLES OF THE SAME GENDER
JENNIFER WRIGGINS *
Abstract: Contemporary family law and marriage law in the United States
have been criticized by communitarian scholars and others as being too fo-
cused on individuals and individual fulfillment. These critiques make
some valid points. it is also important, however; to emphasize that contem-
porary marriage law, for the first time, presents a model of equality and of
reciprocal obligations. The Article articulates a broad framework of the
functions of family and marriage law. It applies both this framework and
the communitarian critique of family law to the issue of same-gender mar-
riage. This analysis leads to the conclusion that same-gender marriage
should be recognized. Arguments against same-gender marriage, discussed
in the Article, contribute to the aatomistic" focus of contemporary family
law.
Two people together is a work heroic in its ordinariness.
—Adrienne Rich, Twenty-One Love Poems, in THE DREAM OF A
COMMON LANGUAGE (1978).
INTRODUCTION
The current debate about whether same-gender couples should
have access to civil marriage ties in with larger discussions about the
general direction of family law in the United States. Several communi-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law: B.A. Yale College,
J.D., Harvard Law School. Thanks to the International Society of Family Law North Ameri-
can Regional Conference, the University of Maine School of Law Faculty Symposium Se-
ries, and the Freedom to Marry Conference at Harvard Law School for allowing use to
present early drafts of this article, and to everyone who provided comments on those occa-
sions. For research assistance, thanks to Tanya Floerchinger. For logistical assistance,
thanks to Ruth Miner. For particularly helpful conversations, thanks to Lois Lupica and
Thomas L. Shaffer. I appreciate the insights of Katharine Baker, Mary L. Bonauto, Or-
lando Delogu, Edward Godfrey, Ej. Graff, Dean Colleen Khoury, Michael Lang, Sive Nei-
lan, Nancy Wanderer and Donald Zillman, who reviewed drafts. I am grateful for research
support for this article provided by the University of Maine School of Law.
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=Ian' scholars in the family law area, including Mary Ann Glendon, 2
Carl Schneider, 3 and Bruce Hafen4 have focused on the ways in which
family law has been retreating from duties and responsibilities, and
increasingly has become focused rather exclusively on individuals and
individual rights.5
 They have expressed concern that this atomistic
The boundaries of the category of communitarian scholars are far from clear. As
Marsha Garrison notes, 'while communitarian thinkers are a diverse group, they uniformly
favor a deemphasis on abstract individual rights; they tend to emphasize the individual's
embeddedness in various conununities of interest, such as the family." Marsha Garrison,
An Evaluation of Two Models of Parental Obligation, 86 CAL. L. REV. 41, n.205 (1998). Glen-
don and Hafen have been characterized as communitarian. Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E.
Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REV. 1225, 1227 n.3 (1998) [hereinafter
Scott, Relational Contract]. Elizabeth Scott notes that Carl E. Schneider's article, The Chan-
nellingFunction in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REv. 495 (1992) [hereinafter Schneider, The
Channelling Function], "suggests sympathy with at least some parts of the communitarian
critique." Elizabeth S. Scott, Rehabilitating Liberalism in Modern Divorce Law, 1994 UTAH L.
REV. 687, '708 n.82. Some of Schneider's later work, such as Carl E. Schneider, Marriage,
Morals, and the Law: No-Fault Divorce and Moral Discourse, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 503 (1994)
[hereinafter Schneider, Marriage and Morals], and Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the
Ransformation of American Family Lam 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803 (1985) [hereinafter, Schnei-
der; Moral Discourse], even more strongly suggests sympathy with the communitarian cri-
tique. Milton Regan and Martha Minow also have been referred to as corm unitarian. See
Scott, Relational Contract, supra, at 1227-28 un.3 & 5.
2 MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW, AND FAM-
ILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE (1989) [hereinafter GLENDON, TRANS-
FORMATION OF FAMILY LAW]; MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN
LAW (1987) (hereinafter GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE].
3 Schneider, Marriage and Morals, supra note 1; Schneider, The Channelling Function, su-
pra note 1; Schneider, Moral Discourse, supra note 1.
4
 Bruce C. Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy in Family Law: The Waning of Belonging;
1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1991) [hereinafter Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy]; Bruce C.
Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy; Balancing the Indi-
vidual and Social Interests, 81 'Micx. L. REV. 463 (1983) [hereinafter Hafen, Constitutional
Status].
5
 Professor Glendon has extended this argument to other areas of law. See MARX ANN
GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991) [herein-
after RIGHTS TALK] . See generally ROBERT BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDI-
VIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (1985). Martha Minow and others have
been critical of family law's focus on protecting autonomous individuals. Martha L. Minow,
Forming Underneath Everything that Grows: Toward a History of Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. REV.
819, 894 (1985) [hereinafter Minow, Forming Underneath]. Minow has also argued that fam-
ily law should be more concerned than it has been recently with duties and obligations,
Martha L. Minow, All in the Family and in all Families: Membership, Loving and Owing, 95 W.
VA. L. REV. 275, 304, 307 (1992-93) [hereinafter Minow, All in the Family]. Minow has also
noted limitations of rights discourse, but has argued that tights claims actually imply rela-
tionships among interdependent community members. MARTHA MINOW, MAIUNG ALL THE
DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 268-69, 292-95 (1990); Martha
Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover; 96 YALE L.J. 1860, 1863-67 (1987). Mil-
ton C. Regan argues that family law should not be based on a model of individual private
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focus has resulted in what Hafen has called a "waning of belonging."6
This Article will explore the folloWing proposition: if we agree with
scholars such as Glendon, Schneider, and Hafen that family law's in-
creased orientation toward individuals has drawbacks, and that the
state ,should have a role in fostering positive connections between
people, then we must conclude that marriage by couples of the same
gender should be allowed.?
The Article begins by reviewing, in Part I, various influential
ideas about aspects of family law that have been articulated by Glen-
don and Schneider. Specifically, Schneider's discussion of the five
functions of family law (protective, facilitative, dispute resolution, ex-
pressive, and channelling) and Glendon's more detailed discussion of
the expressive function of family law are outlined. 8 These ideas will
serve as a framework, in Part III,. for discussing the exclusion from
marriage of same-gender couples.
Part II.A reviews some of these scholars' critical observations, as
well as the observations of Hafen,.concerning the individual focus of
twentieth century changes in family and marriage law. Their analysis
is termed the "atomism critique."9 Part II.13 responds to the atomism
critique specifically as it relates to marriage and marriage law. It finds
that the critics' account raises legitimate issues. The atomism critique,
however, understates the positive aspects of contemporary marriage
law: for the first time marriage is an anti-individualistic institution in
ordering but should "promote a substantive moral vision of commitment and responsibil-
ity." MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 4 (1993).
° Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy, supra note 4, at 32.
7 See infra Part HI. For other scholarship making related arguments, see Carlos A. Ball,
Moral Foundations of a Discourse on Same-Sex Marriage: Looking Beyond Political Liberalism, 85
GEO. L. J. 1871 (1997); Mary E. Becker, Women, Morality, and Sexual Orientation, 8 U.C.L.A.
WOMEN'S L. J. 165 (1998) [hereinafter Becker, Women and Morality]; Chai R. Feldblum, A
Progressive Moral Case for Same-Sex Marriage, 7 TEMP. POL. & Ctv. RTS. L. REV. 485 (1998);
Linda S. McClain, Toleration, Autonomy, and Governmental Promotion of Good Lives: Beyond
"Empty" Tbleration to Toleration as Respect, 59 OHIO ST. L. J. 19 (1998); REGAN, supra note 5,
at 119-22. This argument is separate from and in addition to the assertion that the federal
Constitution or state constitutions do not allow states to forbid such marriages. An exten-
sive body of scholarship exists on that topic. See e.g., WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, THE CASE FOR
SAME SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL 'LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT (1996); DAVID
A.J. RICHARDS, WOMEN, GAYS, AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE GROUNDS FOR FEMINISM AND
GAY RIGHTS IN CULTURE AND LAW, 411-57 (1998); MARK STRASSER, LEGALLY WED: SAME-
SEX MARRIAGE AND THE CONSTITUTION (1997); Jennifer Wriggins, Maine's 'Act to Protect
•aditional Marriage and Prohibit Same-Sex Marriages: Questions of Constitutionality Under State
and Federal Lau), 50 ME. L. REV. 345 (1998) [hereinafte• Wriggins, Questions of Constitution-
ality].
• s See infra Parts IA and B.
9 See infra Part II.A.
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which both members of the couple are now recognized as individuals
and owe equal duties and commitments to one another.'° Part II.0
briefly reviews some of these scholars' comments about moral dis-
course in family law. This theme is termed the "decline of moral dis-
course" critique. Part II.D responds to this critique, arguing that
moral discourse in family law has shifted at least as much as it has di-
minished.
Part III discusses the significance of the law's refusal to allow les-
bian couples and gay male couples to marry. It argues that the ato-
mism critique, at a general level, leads to a set of reasons for allowing
such marriages distinct from the familiar rights-based claims. It fur-
ther argues that the shift in moral concerns that has taken place in
family law calls for recognition of such marriages.
The discussion in: Part III is structured in terms of the various
functions of family law as outlined by Schneider and Glendon. The
expressive message sent by the law is that lesbians and gay men are
essentially lone, atomistic individuals. 11
 This story told by the law is
false, because gay and lesbian people do have intimate, long-term re-
lationships that are both fulfilling for them and good for society.' 2
 Gay
male and lesbian couples by and large are left "outside the law,"13
without the framework offered by legal marriage through which to
order their relationships.'{ Marriage can promote and support con-
structive connections between people and can counteract the "waning
of belonging."15
Part III also describes how family law largely fails to perform its
instrumental functions of facilitation, protection, and dispute resolu-
tion for coupled lesbians and gay men, and argues that if marriage
IS See infra Part II.B.
11 See infra Part IIIA.
12 See infra Part III A.
13 Craig W. Christensen, Legal Ordering of Family Values: The Case of Gay and Lesbian Fami-
lies, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1299, 1300 (1997) [hereinafter Christensen, Legal Ordering].
14 See infra Part III. In arguing that the "framework offered by marriage'should be
available to lesbian and gay couples, I am not taking a position hi the debates about
whether to characterize marriage as a status or as a contract, whether to emphasize one
aspect or the other, or whether these aspects are opposed. See, e.g., REGAN, supra note 5, at
89-152; Scott, Relational Contract, supra note 1, at 1233-49; Katherine B. Silbaugh, Marriage
Contracts and the Family Economy, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 65, 111-22 (1998) [hereinafter Silbaugh,
Family Economy]. The defaults that marriage creates, however characterized, should be
available to lesbian and gay male couples. See Christensen, Legal Ordering, supra note 13, at
1344-47. For further discussion of issues concerning marriage as a status or contract and
the contractualization of marriage law, see infra notes 86-89, 241-46, and accompanying
text.
16 See infra Part
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was allowed it could more effectively fulfill these functions. 16 Family
law's channelling function tries to funnel lesbian and gay people into
heterosexual marriage or independent existence. 17 There is no valid
reason for the current channelling that excludes gay men and lesbi-
ans from marriage; having a channelling option of marriage would be
positive for society as a whole. 18
Finally, Part IV discusses some arguments why such marriages
nonetheless should not be allowed, such as the argument that the
quest for marriage by same-gender couples is actually a retreat from
marriage, 19 the argument that heterosexual marriage has greater po-
tential for benefiting individuals and society than does same-gender
marriage,20 and the argument that gay men and lesbians seeking mar-
riage are actually repudiating morality by doing so.21 These arguments
lack merit, particularly when considered in light of the preceding
analysis. Indeed, refusing to allow marriage by same-gender couples
furthers the trend toward atomization.
I. LAW'S FUNCTIONS IN FAMILY LAW
It is important to bear in mind that there is no consensus even as
to what family law is22 and that there are basic issues in the field about
what constitutes a family. 23 As Bruce Hafen has noted, "Mama) , law
to See infra Part III.B.
17 See infra Part III.C.
18 See infra Part IILC.
19 See infra Part IV.A. The arguments discussed in Part IV are articulated in Lynn D.
Wardle, Legal Claims for Same-Sex Marriage: Efforts to Legitimate a Retreat from Marriage by
Redefining Martiagr, 39 S. TEx. L. REV. 735 (1998) [hereinafter Wardle, Efforts to Legitimate].
20 See infra Part WI.
21 See infra Part N.C. For additional material countering arguments against same-
gender marriage, see, for example, sources cited in note 7, supra; Mary Bonauto et al., The
Freedom to Marry for Same-Sex Couples: The Opening Appellate Brief of Plaintiffs Stan Baker et al.
in Baker et al. v. State of Vermont, 5 MIcn. J. GENDER & L 409 (1999). Mary Bonauto et
al., The Freedom to Marry for Same...Sex Couples: The Reply Brief of Plaintiffs Stan Baker et al. in
Baker et al. v. State of Vermont, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1 (1999); Andrew Koppelinan, Is
Marriage Inherently Heterosexual?, 42 Am. J. Juan. 51 (1997) [hereinafter Koppelman, Is
Marriage Inherently Heterosexual T]
22 Dean Judith Areen notes in her preface to a family law casebook, "there is no con-
sensus about the proper scope of the [family law] course." JUDITH AREEN, CASES AND MA-
TERIALS oN Eustrix LAW (3d. Ed. 1992). Areen also notes "the general lack of theory to
employ in organizing the material." Id.
"Martha Minow notes that the three basic issues in family law are who is in a family.
what benefits are obtained by being in a family and what obligations are incurred by being
in a family. See Minow, All in the Family, supra note 5, at 275-76.
270	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 41:265
has always been longer on practice than on theory." 24 There is no
overarching theory of family law, and there is likewise no overarching
theory of family law for gay men and lesbians. 25 However, the schol-
arly work outlined below concerning the various functions of family
law provides an analytically useful framework for discussion.
A. The Five Functions of Family Law—Protective, Facilitative, Dispute
Resolution, Expressive, and Channelling
Carl Schneider has written that there are five functions of family
law:26 the protective function, the facilitative function, the dispute
resolution function, the expressive function, and the channelling
function.27
 In his fascinating article entitled The Channelling Function
in Family Law, 28
 he outlines each of these functions. Regarding the
protective function, he states: "[Ole of law's most basic duties is to
protect citizens against harm done them by other citizens. This means
protecting people from physical harm, as the law of spouse and child
abuse attempts to do, and from non-physical harms, especially eco-
nomic wrongs and psychological injuries."29 The second function "is
to help people organize their lives and affairs in the ways they prefer.
Family law performs this 'facilitative' function by offering people the
law's services in entering and enforcing contracts, by giving legal ef-
fect to their private arrangements."'" The third function "is to help
people resolve disputes."31
 The current law of divorce "exemplifies
family law's 'arbitral' function, since today's divorce courts primarily
adjudicate conflicting claims to marital property, alimony, and child
custody."32
The law's "expressive" function is also important to Schneider
and other scholars." Schneider writes that this fourth, expressive,
24 Hafen, Constitutional Status, supra note 4, at 489.
25 See Christensen, Legal Ordering, supra note 13, at 1306.
" See Schneider, The Channelling Function, supra note 1, at 497. The channelling func-
tion has proven a useful concept in applying economic theories to families. Ann Lague'.
Estin, Love and Obligation: Family Law and the Romance of Economics, 36 Wm. & MARY L. REV.
989, 1048, 1050 (1995).
27 Schneider, The Channelling Function, supra note 1, at 502-03.
28 Id. at 495.
28 Id. at 497.
30 Id. at 497.
51 Id.
32 Schneider, The Channelling Function, supra note I, at 497..
33 See infra Part I.B.; see, e.g., GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE, supra note 2, at 8-9;
Milton C. Regan, Jr., How Does Law Matter? 1 GREEN BAG 2d 265, 270-75 (1998); Carol
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function, discussed in more detail in Part I.B, "works by deploying the
law's power to impart ideas through words and symbols."54 The final
function listed by Schneider is the channelling function. In the chan-
nelling function, "the law creates or (more often) supports social in-
stitutions which are thought to serve socially desirable ends."35 The
channelling function works partly as a way of performing law's protec-
tive, facilitative, and dispute resolution functions, but the channelling
function is also something more. 56 To Schneider, the channelling
function has several tasks: first to recruit, mold, and sustain social in-
stitutions, and second to channel people into institutions.57 It gener-
ally works by indirect means, such as by recognizing and endorsing
institutions, rewarding participation in some institutions, disfavoring
competing institutions, and penalizing non-use of particular institu-
tions." It has an efficiency component," so that people entering an
institution do not have to invent all the rules from scratch, and peo-
ple outside that institution can have a clear understanding of the
rules governing those within the institution.40
Schneider uses the example of the laws surrounding corpora-
tions41 and marriage42 to describe the channelling function. Accord-
ing to Schneider, the advantages of institutions in family law are illu-
minated by situations involving their absence, such as stepparent
situations.° Channelling institutions "set bright lines which establish
for all concerned what people's status is. They make it easier for peo-
ple to predict the consequences of their own acts. Further, they pro-
Weisbrod, Essay on the Expressive Functions of Family Law, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 991,995-09
(1989).
Schneider, The Channelling Function, supra note 1, at 498. While part of the point of
the expressive function is, as Schneider says, to alter behavior, he acknowledges that it is
extremely difficult to draw clear conclusions froni data in the family law area and thus
determinh ►g the impact of any particular program or set of laws is often impossible. See id.
at 521-22. For further discussion of the expressive function, see infra Part I.B.
35 See Schneider, The Channelling Function, supra note 1, at 498
36 See id. at 505-07.
" See id. at 502.
38 See id. at 503-05.
39 See id. at 498. Schneider says he is "wryly" calling this aspect an efficiency compo-
nent. See Schneider, The ChannellingFunction; supra note 1, at 508-09.
4° See id. at 509. For instance, he uses the example that a person wearing a wedding
ring sends a message that that person is not sexually available. See id.
43 See id. at 499,505-07.
42 See id. at 499,501-12.
43 See Schneider, The Channelling Function, supra note 1, at 510. In such situations there
is often "discomfort and even distress" about the "unclear and uncomfortable" relation-
ships between stepparents and stepchildren. Id. at 510 (citations omitted).
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tect people from intrusive governmental inquiries." 44
 He uses Marvin
Marvin,45
 the famous California Supreme Court case involving im-
plied contracts and equitable remedies for unmarried opposite-sex
partners who break up, to illustrate the costs, unpredictability, and
intrusion that can come from case-by-case inquiry. 46
 Channelling's
institutions "necessarily have normative components and thus to some
degree favor one such vision over the rest."47
 Schneider notes that it is
extremely difficult to measure and analyze data pertinent to family
law issues, and thus it is difficult to measure the success of any particu-
lar program or set of laws. 48 These functions of family law will be fur-
ther discussed in Part III below in relation to marriage by same-
gender couples.
B. Law's Expressive Function
—The Story Told by Law
Mary Ann Glendon, like many others, has emphasized law's rhe-
torical, expressive functions. 49
 She notes in the introduction to her
study comparing abortion and divorce law in the United States and
Western Europe that law, "in addition to all the other things it does,
tells stories about the culture that helped to shape it and which it in
turn helps to shape: stories about who we are, where we came from,
and where we are going.”5° She writes:
Indeed, it may be that law affects our lives at least as much by
these stories as it does by the specific rules, standards, insti-
tutions, and procedures of which it is composed. Thus it is
not an unworthy task for scholars to ask how law interprets
the world around it, what analogies and images it employs,
44 Id. at 521.
n 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
46 See Schneider, The Channelling Function, supra note 1, at 514, 521. Glendon makes
similar observations. See GLENDON, TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW, SUM note 2, at 279—
80.
47 Schneider, The Channelling Function, supra note 1, at 529.
45 See id. at 515-16, 521-22. Schneider wrote -all schemes of statutory regulation are
ultimately based on unprovable assumptions about human nature." Id. at 525, quoting
Schneider, State-Interest Analysis in Fourteenth Amendment "Privacy" Law: An Essay on the Con-
stitutionalization of Social Issues, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 103 (1988).
49 See GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE, supra note 2, at 8. See generally JAMES BOYD
WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW (1985); BE-
GAN, supra note 5, at 176-84; Regan, supra note 33, at 269-74.
59 GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE, ,SUPra note 2, at 8.
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what segments of history and what aspects of human experi-
ence it treats as relevant."
Quoting James Boyd White, Glendon states that law is "'an element in
the perpetual remaking of the language and the culture that deter-
mines ... who we are as individuals and as a society."52 In the context
of divorce and abortion law, she asks, 1w] hat stories are being told in
these bodies of law at the present time? How do these stories affect
what issues are raised and treated as important and which are ex-
cluded from discussion or perhaps even obscured from view? . . . What
sorts of meaning is family law creating and what sort of society is it
helping to constituter" These questions will be considered as they
relate to marriage of same-gender couples in Part III.A.
II. COMMUNITARIAN CRITIQUES OF CONTEMPORARY MARRIAGE AND
FAMILY LAW, AND RESPONSES TO THESE CRITIQUES
It is a truism that the law pertaining to marriage and families in
the United States has changed dramatically over the past fifty years. As
Glendon notes, changes in marriage and family law are "but an aspect
of the fact that society itself is in flux."54 Marriage, families, and the
law concerning them have changed significantly throughout recorded
history.55 "Over the centuries, family behavior and ideas about mar-
riage and family life have undergone constant fluctuation." 56 In the
past, the financial and procreative aspects of marriage were central
features of marriage; now, the affective aspects are seen as central to
its meaning.57 This section broadly focuses on various developments
and how they have been viewed in the work of Glendon, Schneider,
and Hafen. As these scholars note, the developments in this field are
complex and at times contradictory, and thus any attempt at system-
51 Id.
52 Id. at 9, quotingJantes Boyd White. Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural
and Communal Life, 52 U. Cm. L. REV. 684, 691 (1985).
55 Id.
54 GLENDON, TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW, supra note 2, at 4.
55 See generally Ej. GRAFF, WHAT IS MARRIAGE FOR? (1999); MICHAEL GROSSEERG,
GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA
(1985j; LAWRENCE STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE: ENGLAND 1530-1987 (1990) .
55 GLENDON, TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW, supra note 2, at 4.
57 See id. at 292-93; ESKRIDGE, supra note 7, at 96-98, 129-30. See generally GRAFF, supra
note 55.
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atic discussion runs the risk of being unduly reductionistic.58 The ma-
jor critique this Article will discuss and respond to is the idea that
family law has become too centered on individuals and their rights:
the atomism critique. 59 It will also discuss and respond to the idea that
family law has retreated from concerns with inorality. 8°
A. The Atomism Critique
One prominent theme in these scholars' work is that marriage
and family law have become too focused on individuals, their self-
fulfillment, and their rights. 8i In The Transformation of Family Law,
Glendon states:
[T]he legal imagery of separateness and independence [in
U.S. family law] contrasts everywhere with the way most
functioning families operate and with the circumstances of
mothers and young children in both intact and broken
homes. Yet the law holds self-sufficiency up as an ideal, sug-
gesting that dependency is somehow degrading, and implic-
itly denying the importance of human intersubjectivity. 62
American marriage ideology, to Glendon, is that "marriage is a rela-
tionship that exists primarily for the fulfillment of the individual
spouses. If it ceases to perform this function, no one is to blame and
either spouse may terminate it at will." 6S According to Glendon in her
comparative study of abortion and divorce in the U.S. and Western
Europe, "[m]ore than any other country among those examined
here, the United States has accepted the idea of no-fault, no-
responsibility divorce."64 Divorce law "carries a powerful ideology,
58 See GLENDON, TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW, supra note 2, at 2-3, 103; Hafen, In-
dividualism and Autonomy, supra note 4, at 6; Schneider, The ChannellingFunction, supra note
1, at 512-19.
59 See infra Parts II.A and II.B.
60 See infra Part II.0 and II.D.
61 Others have raised somewhat similar concerns. See, e.g., Minow, Forming Underneath,
supra note 5, at 893-94 (noting that family law's focus on autonomous individuals and their
rights is reductionistic and stating that family law should ntuture relationships); REGAN,
supra note 5, at 56-67 (noting that modern family law is focused on the individual and on
emotional fulfillment which may result in more gratifying emotional relationships but
make families less stable).
92 GLENDON, TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW, supra note 2, at 297. lntersubjective"
is defined as "involving or occurring between separate conscious minds." WEBSTER'S NEW
ColizotATE litcnortatv (1981). The noun form is intersubjecthity. See id.
63 GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE, supra note 2, at 108.
64 Id. at 105.
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sending out distinctive messages about commitment, responsibility
and dependency."65 To her, the disjunction between the model of
autonomous individuals, on the one hand, and the actual depend-
ence of young children and their caretakers, on the other hand, has
tremendous negative consequences, since young children and their
caretakers so often end up in poverty after divorce. 66
Schneider sounds a similar note regarding contemporary U.S.
marriage. He states that "[m]arriage is ever more seen as a forum for
satisfying human needs, as part of the search for psychological health
and personal fulfillment. . . . This reconceptualization of marriage in
therapeutic terms . . . tends to shift the focus of concern from duties
to others to duties to oneself."67 He further states that "Ulf the pri-
mary duty is to oneself, independence becomes a virtue; dependence
a fault."68 For example, Schneider notes that "[h]istorically, spouses
were admired for sacrificing themselves for each other" 69 but finds
that is no longer the case."
Bruce Hafen frames individualist autonomy as opposing the idea
of belonging in approaching recent family law history. 71 He observes
that attitudes toward marriage have been shifting from "familistic" 72 to
65 Id. at 106. Glendon argues that the law should develop clear principles for at least
two different types of divorces, one for the short-term marriage where there are no chil-
dren and the spouses (implicitly) are not economically dependent or interdependent. See
id. A different set of principles should be applied for the largest single category of divorce;
those situations where there are small children. See id. at 102. The majority of divorces
involve families with small children. Sec GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE, supra note 2,
at 102. Children's needs should always be placed above adults' needs, and divorcing par-
ents' "contracts" concerning children's care should receive court scrutiny. See id.
66 Id. at 93,99-103,109-11.
Schneider, Marriage and Morals, supra note 1, at 525.
68 Id. at 526.
eg Id. at 533.
70
 See id.
71 See Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy, supra note 4, at 3. See generally Hafen, Constitu-
tional Status, supra note 4.
7'2 Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy, supra note 4, at 23. Hafen uses sociologist Fithian
Sorokin's typology of personal relationships: familistic, contractual and compulsory. See id.
at 23. "Familistic relationships involve an intermingled and organic unity in which shared
commitments of mutual attachment transcend self-interest. Such interaction derives from
an unlimited personal commitment, not merely to another person, but to the good of the
relationship or the family entity as a larger order." Id. at 23-24. Contractual relationships
are very different:
[Such relationships] by definition are always limited in scope and intensity
Parties enter a contractual relationship primarily because of self-interest;
therefore, their commitment is measured by the extent to which the relation-
ship assures them of profit, pleasure, or service.... Neither party to a con-
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contractual," and that family members increasingly tend to see them-
selves primarily as individuals rather than as parts of a larger group. 74
He claims that "individualistic civil liberties approaches" have been
"transfer[red] to the divorce context,"" with attendant problems for
the spouse who does not want the marriage to terminate." Hafen
notes that law and other behavior-oriented disciplines such as psycho-
therapy and theology "are less likely to reinforce any serious hope for
the ideal of enduring relationships of commitment."77
Hafen eloquently describes the importance of connections be-
tween people: "ours is the age of the waning of belonging." In a sec-
tion of an article that he describes as "consciously anecdotal and in-
terdisciplinary,"" he writes about how "belonging"-type relationships
demand that we draw on internal resources that might not otherwise
be tapped:
The innate human intuition to belong occurs, and is often
fulfilled, at the most fundamental levels of both human ex-
perience and aspiration.... Without a sense of belonging,
we may never know—and never see the effects of—the reser-
voirs of strength and compassion we carry within ourselves.
That is a loss not only to ourselves, but a major loss to soci-
e'.80
In an earlier article, he emphasizes the commitment typified by mar-
riage: "the formal commitment of marriage is ... the basis of stable
expectations in personal relationships. The willingness to marry per-
mits important legal and personal assumptions to arise about one's
tract may assume that the other acts in constant good faith, because,
reflecting free market assumptions, both parties are expected to interpret the
limits of their commiunent according to self-interest.
Id. at 24. Third, compulsory relationships "are exclusively antagonistic: master and slave,
conqueror and captive," although the individual with the power in the relationship may
deploy ideology masking the power relationship. Id. at 24-25.
73 See Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy, supra note 4, at 25-27. "No-fault" divorce is an
example of this shift, according to him. .See id. For further discussion of the shift to con-
tract, see infra notes 86-89.
74 See Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy, supra note 4, at 24-25.
79 Id. at 27.
76 See id.
77 Id. at 37.
78 See id. at 32.
" Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy, supra note 4, at 31.
Id. at 39-41.
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intentions."81 He also contrasts legal marriage with unmarried cohabi-
tation: "legal marriage is more likely than is unmarried cohabitation
to encourage such personal willingness to labor and 'invest' in rela-
tionships with other people, whether child or adult?" He also notes
that the range of "legally and socially acceptable" family forms has
widened in the twentieth century to include "working' mothers, fami-
lies headed by women, families in which fathers share housework, and
families without children. "83 He also posits that "marriage alone plays
a critical role in the democratic structure by interposing a significant
legal entity between the individual and the state." 84 He hopes that in
the future, "family law will find ways to sing more clearly the melody
of belonging."86
One of the ways in which family and marriage law have become
more individual-oriented, as many have observed, is through the
gradual move from status to contract. 86 Glendon, Schneider, and
ai Hafen, Constitutional Status, supra note 4. at 485-86.
82 Id. at 486. Milton Regan takes a similar position. See REGAN, supra note 5, at 122-28
(noting that unmarried unions tend to be less stable than married unions and arguing for
a clear distinction between married and unmarried status). Mary Becker also contrasts the
benefits of marriage with cohabitation. See Mary E. Becker, Family Law in the Secular State
and Restrictions on Same-Sex Marriage: Two Are Better than One, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2000) [hereinafter Becker, Two Are Better] (noting the cohabiting couples' rela-
tionships tend to be less stable and satisfying to their members than relationships between
members of married couples).
83 Hafen, Constitutional Status, supra note 4, at 490.
1" Id. at 483.
Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy, supra note 4, at 42.
86 Id. at 25-26, 38; Schneider, Marriage and Morals, supra note 1, at 532-36. Various
scholars have voiced concerns about the increased contractualization of family law. See, e.g.,
REGAN, supra note 5, at 2-3, 39-42; Minow, Redefining Families: Who's In and M'ho's Out. 62
U. COL. L. REV. 269,282-83 (1991) [hereinafter Miaow, Redefining Families). Craig Chris-
tensen notes the difficulty of applying traditional contract principles to intimate relation-
ships. See Christensen, Legal Ordering, supra note 13, at 1327-28. He also concludes that
increased use of contracts by same-gender couples will be positive but will not be an ade-
quate substitute for 'marriage as a comprehensive arbiter of legally enforceable rights." Id.
at 1347. Implicit in his idea, as well as in Regan's, Hafen's, and others', is the idea that
marriage is something more than an individually negotiated contract; Regan and others
refer to this as a status. There is debate about many aspects of the contractualization of
family law. One scholar recently proposed incorporating commercial contract principles
into marriage law through a premarital security agreement, pursuant to which the primary
homemaker gets a security interest in the primary wage-earner's post-divorce income. See
Martha M. Ertnian, Commercializing Marriage: A Proposal for Valuing Women's Work Through
Premarital Security Agreements, 77 Ttx. L. REV. 17 (1998) [hereinafter Ertman, Commercializ-
ing Marriage]. Another scholar has argued that the status/contract distinction is simplistic,
and that selective enforcement of premarital agreements, pursuant to which financial
terms are enforced while non-monetary terms are not enforced, disadvantages women. See
Silbaugh, Family Economy, supra note 14. She further argues that premarital agreements
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Hafen all find problems with the introduction of a contractual ap-
proach to family law. Hafen suggests that people invest less in their
family relationships if a contractual approach is used.87 Glendon notes
that prenuptial agreements "are nearly always used to insulate the
property of the more powerful spouse, who in Most cases will have the
better bargaining position."88 And Schneider concludes that "contract
law is primarily seen as a way of relieving people of obligations the
laws and social norms have historically embodied." 89
Glendon and Schneider both discuss how the law of marriage
and divorce has developed toward a model that does not recognize
dependency or connections between human beings in a constructive
way. To them and many others including many feminist scholars," this
is a serious shortcoming of modern marriage and family law. 91 Glen-
don notes that families still provide much non-market care for the
helpless (young, old, and disabled), despite the shortage of caregiv-
ers." Law should recognize this and yet does not, since it imposes an
unrealistic model of autonomy. Family law in the United States should
more effectively take account of actual relationships of dependency,
for example when there are small children, according to Glendon,
should be unenforceable. See id. Stilt another approach is to challenge the idea that con-
tractualization necessarily is related to atomism and lack of conmdtment. Robert and
Elizabeth Scott argue that "contracts can serve very well as a basis for an enduring, com-
mitted relationship. Only two modest assumptions are required: that many individuals
entering marriage are motivated to undertake a long-term commitment and wish to secure
reciprocal commitments from their partners, and that both parties share the goal of a
lasting marriage." Scott, Relational Contract, supra note 1, at 1246. They argue that the core
meaning of contract is commitment. See id. at 1246. Even the writers who seem to favor
increased "contractualization" of family law, recognize a need for broad principles or de-
faults such as those created by marriage rules. See Scott, Relational Contract, supra note 1, at
1320-29; Ertman, Commercializing Marriage, supra at 55,59-60 n.159.
87 He writes that 'when commitments among spouses and children are unqualified, we
learn and grow to an extent not possible in self-oriented, limited relationships of contract."
Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy, supra note 4, at 39.
88 GLENDON, TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW, Mira note 2, at 139. She notes that
while marriage contract proponents initially saw such contracts as "the ideal way to pre-
serve the neutrality of the state, promote sex equality and respect individual liberty," in
reality the issues are not so simple in view of power dynamics and issues about what should
and should not be subject to contract. Id. For expression of similar concerns regarding
applying traditional contract principles to intimate relationships, see Christensen, Legal
Ordering, supra note 13, at 1327-28.
"Schneider, Marriage and Morals, supra note 1, at 532.
98 See generally MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL Frustum, AND
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995); lirlinow, Forming Underneath, supra note 5,
at 894; Robin West, jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. Ctn. L. REV. 1,1-3 (1988).
91 See infra notes 127 and 257 for additional scholarship on these points.
92 See GLENDON, TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW, supra note 2, at 306-07.
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Schneider, and others. These important observations will be linked
with the law concerning same-gender couples in Part III."
B. Limitations of the Atomism Critique
Glendon, Schneider, and Hafen rightly highlight the dominant
trend in the changes in laws over the last fifty years concerning mar-
riage, divorce, and family as moving toward recognizing individuals as
individuals, with individual rights. 94 For example, "nonfault divorce,"
to use Glendon's term," has made it easier for a spouse to leave a
marriage if the spouse is unhappy in the marriage, even if the other
spouse does not want the marriage to end." Enforcement of premari-
tal agreements concerning property has increased, which allows peo-
ple to tailor their post-divorce economic arrangements individually. 97
Developments such as the abrogation of interspousal tort immunity"
and the availability of protective orders for domestic violence" recog-
nize members of married couples as individuals in new ways. Glendon
and Schneider also acknowledge that people may live their lives in
more interconnected and generous ways than law or their own 'Ian-
93 See infra Parts III and IV.
" This trend is only partial regarding children. See Bruce C. Hafen & Jonathan 0.
Hafen, Abandoning Children to Their Autonomy: The United Nations Convention on the Rights of
the Child, 6 HARV. LJ. 449, 451-57 (1996); Martha Minow, li'llatever Happened to Chil-
dren's Rights, 80 MINN. L. REV. 267 (1995).
GLENDON, TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW, supra note 2, at 188-89.
98 It is not clear precisely what role nonfault or no-fault divorce played in causing the
heightened divorce rate front the seventies to the nineties. Naomi Cahn terms no-fault
divorce a "contributing factor' but also points out that the divorce rate began rising well
before no-fault was introduced and that many factors have contributed to it. See Naomi R.
Cahn, Review Essay: The Moral Complexities of Family Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 225, 249-50
(1997). No-fault divorce and its consequences have spawned a proliferation of literature;
for a recent discussion, see Katherine T. Bartlett, Saving the Family from the &forme's, 31
U.C. Dims L. REV. 809 (1998).
97 See Silbaugh, Family Economy, supra note 14; Erman, Commercializing Marriage, supra
note 86, at 60 n.159.
" See, e.g., Hakkila v Hakkila, 812 P.2d 1320, 1326-27 (N.M. 1991) (finding action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress not barred in interspousal context); McCoy v.
Cooke, 419 N.W.2d 44, 46 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (reversing trial court's dismissal of wife's
action for assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress for conduct of
former husband during marriage); Courtney v. Courtney, 413 S.E.2d 418, 420 (W. Va.
1991) (same); Stuart v. Stuart, 421 N.W,2d 505 (Wis. 1988) (same).
" See Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women:
An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801 (1993).
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guage would indicate. 100
 Also, as Hafen notes, many people tend to
see permanent commitment as the idea1. 101
Nonetheless, to some extent, Glendon, Schneider, and Hafen
overstate the extent to which marriage has become simply an institu-
tion for self-fulfillment. To a large extent, the old non-reciprocal du-
tiesm of civil marriagem have been replaced by matching, reciprocal
duties.'" New family medical leave statutes recognize connections be-
tween people that were previously ignored by law.ws "The story told by
law"I06
 about marriage now is not that it is simply an institution for
100 See GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE, supra note 2, at 141-42; GLENDON, TRANS-
FORMATION OF FAMILY LAW, supra note 2, at 312-13; Schneider, Marriage and Morals, supra
note 1, at 556-57, 583.
101 See Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy, supra note 4, at 34.
102 See infra notes 108-20 and accompanying text.
103
 Family law in the United States, including marriage law, is civil law rather then re-
ligious law. Lawrence M. Friedman states "[i]n England, ecclesiastical courts had jurisdic-
tion over marriage and divorce, and the church had an importam role in family law. The
United States had no such court, and, after the early nineteenth century, no established
churches. Family law was thoroughly secular in the United States." LAWRENCE M. FRIED-
MAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 202 (1985).
IN See infra notes 108-20 and accompanying text. Glendon seems to conclude that this
is not so. She writes:
[t]he trend toward withdrawal of regulation of the ongoing marriage in the
United States is reinforced by the advance of the equality principle. While
equality theoretically can be implemented by extending legal rights and du-
ties connected with marriage to whichever sex previously lacked them, the
equality principle more often, in combination with other factors, results in
diminished rights and duties for both, draining marriage of much of its legal
content [and] promoting the idea of marriage as an association of separate
individuals....
GLENDON, TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAw, supra note 2, at 95. Despite Glendon's asser-
tion, it seems that generally, duties and rights connected with marriage have been ex-
tended to whichever sex previously lacked them, as discussed infra at notes 108-120 and
accompanying text. It is not clear exactly what Glendon is referring to when she discusses
the "trend towards withdrawal of regulation of the ongoing marriage," since earlier she
discussed the longstanding "principle" and practice of "noninterference in private life"
that was dominant from the time of John Stewart Mill in common law systems. Id. at 86.
She contrasts the continental systems which leave open possible judicial involvement in
ongoing marriages, with the United States' "traditional approach of nonintervention." Id.
at 94-95. Thus, it is not clear how the advance of the equality principle reinforces the
trend toward withdrawal of regulation of the ongoing marriage. While it may be the case
that the "other factors" she alludes to result in diminished rights and duties, the legal re-
forms in marriage seem generally to have extended duties, not contracted them.
1°5 See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2615 (1994). The Act
requires certain employers to give qualified employees time off to care for a sick spouse,
child or parent. Id. Various states also have family leave acts. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 12945.2 (West 2000).
06 See GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE, supra note 2, at 9.
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individual self-fulfillment, but rather that it is an institution based on
equality and mutual connnitment."7
For example, at common law, the wife owed a duty to provide
companionship and services to the husband, but the husband owed
no such duty to the wife.'" Thus, the husband could .sue a third party
for loss of her consortium, but she could not sue for loss of his con-
sortium because she had no right to it. The common law and statutes,
largely in the 1970s, came to provide that each spouse had a duty to
provide services and companionship to the other, so that each spouse
could sue for the loss of the other's companionship.m The law could
have developed so that neither spouse had a duty to provide such serv-
ices and companionship to the other, but it did not.
Similarly, at common law and well into this century, the husband
owed a duty of support to the wife as long as she lived with him, but
she had no duty to support the husband (even if she could do so). 110
107 It can be difficult to determine whether various developments further the trend
toward atomization or not. For example. the Louisiana Covenant Marriage Law. LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9:307 (West 1997), heralded by some as a return to an earlier era when cou-
ples were more unified, actually can be seen as furthering the individualization of family
law because it gives individuals and couples the opportunity to choose which set of divorce
laws will apply to them should they separate.
1° See Reva Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives' Rights to
Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEO. L. J. 2127, 2194 (1994), citing 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 142 [hereinafter Siegel, Modernization]; see, e.g.
Baird v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Tex. Pac. R.R. Co., 368 S.W.2d 172 (Ky. 1963) (holding
wife can not maintain action to recover for loss of husband's consortium although hus-
band can maintain action to recover for loss of wife's consortium).
109 See Paul Benjamin Linton, State Equal Rights Amendments: Making a Difference or Mak-
ing a Statement?, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 907, 932 (1997) (noting that state courts have consis-
tently held that loss of consortium must be extended to women to avoid violating equal
rights guarantees); see, e.g., Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel, 525 P.2d 669 (Cal. 1974) (hold-
ing wife has loss of consortium action against third party who injured husband); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 302 (West 1999) (either spouse may sue for loss of consortium); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.02(B) (Anderson 1099) (in wrongful death actions, surviving
spouse can sue for loss of consortium).
Ho See Robert C. Brown, The Duty of the Husband to Support the Wife, 18 VA. L. REv. 823
(1932), reprinted in .SELECTED ESSAYS ON FAMILY LAW 810, 822 (American Association of
Law Schools eds., 1950); Blanche Crozier, Marital Support, 15 B.U. L. REV. (1935), reprinted
in SELECTED ESSAYS ON FAMILY LAW 831 (American Association of Law Schools eds..
1950); see, e.g., Graham v. Graham, 33 F. Stipp. 936 (1940) (finding husband and wife can
not contract to relieve husband of duty to support wife; contract giving wife obligation to
support husband held void). In 1935, Blanche Crozier discussed the possibility of extend-
ing the duty of support to the wife, arguing that Int is not possible to extend the duty of
support to the wife so long as she is not the owner of her own means of support, her labor
.... The husband's ownership of the wife's labor is the foundation of his duty of support;
and one is as incapable of being made reciprocal as the other." Crozier, Marital Support,
supra, at 859.
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The duty of support was not absolute. For example, according to a
1932 commentator, "[t] here is no question that a wife who is without
justification living apart from her husband is not entitled to sup-
port."" Now the duty of support extends to both spouses. 112 Under
current law, each owes a duty to support the other during the mar-
riage. 113
 Some statutes specify that the duty is owed whether or not the
spouses are living together.'" Thus, not only has the duty to support
been extended to both spouses, but in some instances it is less condi-
tional than it was in the past. As with the example of consortium, the
law could have developed in such a way that neither owed such a duty,
but it did not. 115
One interesting area where a non-reciprocal duty was not ex-
tended to both spouses in recent marriage reform is the duty to fol-
low a spouse. It appears thatzenerally under the common law, as long
as a husband performed his duty of support, he could determine the
wife's place of residence. 116
 For example, until it was struck down in
1983, a Louisiana law stated, "The wife is bound to live with her hus-
In Brown, supra note 110, at 822; see also Steinfield v Girrard, 68 A. 630 (1907)
(finding wife who deserts husband without his fault forfeits right to support from him).
The duty of support and companionship was generally not enforceable as long as the mar-
riage was intact. See, e.g., McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336 (Neb. 1953) (finding wife's
claim that husband should be ordered to provide better living situation dismissed since
parties were living together). This is stilt the case. See Margaret M. Mahoney, Economic Shar-
ing During Marriage: Equal Protection, Spousal Support and the Doctrine of Necessities, 22 J. FAM.
L. 221, 229 (1983-1984).
"2 See Silbaugh, Family Economy, supra note 14, at 84. See generally Mahoney, supra note
111.
113 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 502 (1999) (spouse has duty to support spouse),
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 401.5 (1999) (husband or wife must provide support); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 40-2-102 (1997) (wife and husband have duty to support one another); N.Y. FAIL
CT. ACT § 412 (McKinney 1998) (married pet-son has duty to support spouse); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3103.03 (West 1999) (married person must support spouse), OKLA. ST. ANN.
tit. 43, § 202 (West 2000) (wife must support husband and husband must support wife).
114 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46B-37 (West 1995) (spouse who abandons
spouse without cause is liable for support of abandoned spouse); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
19-A, §§ 1504, 1505 (West 1998) (person has duty to support spouse and children regard-
less of whether person lives with spouse or children). But see CAL. FAM. CODE § 4302 (West
2000) (person not liable for support of spouse when the person is living separate from the
spouse by agreement unless support is stipulated in the agreement).
"5
 The duty, in the past and currently, generally is only enforced by indirect means
such as criminal law, the necessities doctrine or family expense statutes which allow credi-
tors to seek recovery from one spouse for goods that the other spouse purchased. See Ma-
honey, supra note 111, at 229-45.
116 See Brown, supra note 110, at 814, citing Kirk v. Chinstrand, 88 N.W. 422 (Minn.
1901) (finding where husband refuses to permit wife to live with him, he may not dictate
where she may live).
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band and to follow him wherever he chooses to reside: the husband is
obligated to receive her and to furnish her with whatever is required
for the convenience of life, in proportion to his means and condi-
tion."'" The Louisiana Court of Appeals held that the gender-specific
requirement that the wife follow the husband was unconstitutional.'"
Now it appears that neither spouse owes a duty to follow the other.'"
It needs no citation to assert that many married couples with two
wage-earners have difficulty deciding where to live.
Generally, duties within marriage, where practical, have been ex-
tended to both spouses. Regarding the duty to follow a spouse, it
would not be practical for obvious reasons to extend this to both
spouses, and it has not been done. While duties within ongoing mar-
riages are not directly enforceable, this is not new."°
Although both members of the couple now are recognized as in-
dividuals by the law, that does not mean that marriage has become
simply an institution for individual self-fulfillment. )"l As Robin West
writes, "Marriage just is, through and through, anti-individualistic.
That is precisely its moral strength, and no small measure of its im-
mense appeal:122 Marriage law for the first time presents men and
women with a model of mutual duties owed by each member of the
couple to the other. Marriage law has changed from an explicitly pa-
triarchal model where the person who lacked legal identity, and who
did not count as an individual, was the wife. 123
I" La. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 120 (West 1999), quoted in Crosby V. Crosby, 434 So.2d 162,
163 (La. 1983).
118 See Crosby, 434 So.2d at 163, appeal . dismissed per stipulation, 442 So.2d 1248 (La.
1983). This case took place against a backdrop of fault-based divorce laws. In order to ob-
tain alimony, Mrs. Crosby had to show that she was free from fault. The only evidence of
her fault was her refusal to follow Mr. Crosby when he changed domiciles." Id. at 164. The
refusal to follow violated LA. Cm. CODE ANN. art. 120 (West 1999), quoted in the text
above.
119 See id.
120 See Mahoney. supra note 111, at 229-45.
121 Milton Regan states, "spouses ... don't simply help each other construct separate
individual identities .... [T]hey participate in the creation of a shared ... identity." RE-
GAN, supra note 5, at 94.
122 Robin West, Universalism, Liberal Theory, and the Problem of Gay Maroiagr. 25 FLA. ST .
U. L. REV. 705,729 (1998) [hereinafter West, Universalism].
123 See LINDA K. KERBER, No CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES: WOMEN AND THE
OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP (1998) (discussing how Ili the United States married
women's obligations to their families and husbands historically have substituted for their
obligations to the state, and how this has changed only gradually); Siegel, Modernization,
supra note 108, at 2194. Thus, even the idea of some women having autonomy is relatively
new.
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As Katharine Baker has stated, It]raditionally, family relation-
ships were treated as property relationships, with the husband and
father essentially 'owning' his wife and children." 124
 As Baker notes,
"[t]he abolition of coverture and the Married Women's Property Acts
helped alleviate some of the more blatantly subordinating effects of
marriage for women." 125
 Nonetheless, as Reva Siegel has explained in
detail, the legal system resisted legal reforms aimed at improving
wives' economic status, well into this century. 126
 While marriage is now
an institution of formal equality, various factors lead to continuing
concerns about women's status in marriage. 127
Even the idea of women being autonomous individuals is rela-
tively new. While white women and black women historically have
been denied individual autonomy (in very different ways), white
men's individual autonomy has been widely encouraged. 128 As Baker
observes, "the values associated with individualism and autonomy are
values that many men may already have, but that women may
124 Katharine K. Baker, Property Rules Meet Feminist Needs: Respecting Autonomy by thluing
Connection, 59 OHIO ST. L. J. 1523, 1525 (1998).
125
 Id. at 1530.
122 See Siegel, Modernization, supra note 108; Reva Siegel, Home as Work The First
Woman's Rights Claims Concerning Wives' Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073
(1994) [hereinafter Siegel, Home as World.
121 See, e.g., Becker, Women and Morality, supra note 7 (arguing that current marriage
rules exacerbate women's subordinate status); Ertman, Commercializing Marriage, supra note
86, at 17-22, 31 (arguing that devaluation of women's household labor operates to the
detriment of homemakers and all women); Katherine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love:
Housework and the Law, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 6 (1996) [hereinafter Silbaugh, Labor into Love]
(arguing that treatment of women's unpaid household labor disadvantages women).
128 See Baker, SUM note 124, at 1549-58. This framework is extremely broad-brush,
and applies mainly to white women and men in the United States, and not to all of them,
since issues of class, region, religion and so forth complicate matters. It can not be plausi-
bly argued that black men's or black women's autonomy was encouraged in the United
States under slavery. In view of racist legal structures that have persisted throughout most
of the twentieth century, it is difficult to claim that black men's or black women's auton-
omy has at any time been widely encouraged in the same way that some white men's
autonomy has been encouraged. See, e.g., Denise C. Morgan, Jack Johnson: Reluctant Hero of
the Black Community, 32 AKRON L. Rev. 529 (1999) (stating that a strong sense of individual-
ity has been a punishable offense for black Americans for most of the history of the United
States). Gender issues for black women are often very different from gender issues for
white women. in family law as in other areas. See, e.g., Twila L. Perry, Alimony: Race, Privilege,
and Dependency in the Search for Theory, 82 GEO. L J. 2481 (1994) (noting married black
women may be less economically dependent within marriage than white women and that
alimony theory may rest on assumptions more applicable on average to white women than
to black women); Jennifer Wriggins, Note: Rape, Racism, and the Lau; 6 Haim WOMEN'S L.J.
103 (1983) (rape laws and prosecutions historically ignored ail rape of black women while
taking seriously some rape charges by white women, as long as those charges were against
black men).
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need."129 Thus, criticizing the recent individual orientation of family
law and marriage has undertones of targeting women's newfound
autonomy while accepting without question the autonomy which for
many white men has been there all along."0
In discussing marriage, Schneider and Hafen tend to give only
passing attention to the patterns of gender subordination that were
an explicit and integral part of marriage law until recently. For exam-
ple, while Schneider notes that "historically, spouses were admired for
sacrificing themselves for each other,"131 he does not deal with the
gender-based disparity of "sacrifice" expected in "traditional" mar-
riage, and appears to assume that the "sacrifice" expected of each
spouse was the same or equivalent. 132 It was not.133
In short, the changes in the law of marriage over the past fifty
years and longer have created an ideal model of matching duty and
equality, of commitment between spouses.'TM The changes in marriage
law are not just about loosening bonds between people, although
there is that aspect."5 The recent law of marriage presents a model,
not just of individual fulfillment or gratification, but of commitment
to a truly shared, interdependent life.
129 Baker, supra note 124, at 1556.
139 See id. at 1556. See generally Bartlett. Saving the Family from the Reformers, supra note 96.
131 See Schneider, Marriage and Morals. supra note 1, at 523.
133 He notes that many family law reforms have been made in order "to change gender
relations" in American society. See id. at 523. Hafen acknowledges the trend toward gender
equality, see Constitutional Status, supra note 4, at 490, and notes the "widespread evidence
of gender inequality in traditional American culture." Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy,
supra note 4, at 38.
133 See generally Siegel, Modernization, supra note 108. at 2131 (arguing that wives in the
industrial era and in the present were economically disempowered by marriage and im-
poverished by divorce); Siegel, Home as Work, supra note 126 (reviewing efforts to reform
doctrines that gave husband title over property notwithstanding wives' labor contributions
in pre-Civil War period); supra notes 108-09,124-27 and accompanying text.
134 supra notes 108-20 and accompanying text. For a similar argument extending
beyond marriage to family law generally, see generally Calm, Review Essay: The Moral Com-
plexities of Family Law, supra note 96.
133 See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text. Of course, not all loosening of bonds
between people is negative. For example. few would argue for a return to the days when
domestic violence was protected by the mantle of family privacy and the husband-wife
bond. Moreover, it may be that individual autonomy can be a foundation for genuine
community. Katherine Bartlett explicitly makes this link, claiming that "robust notions of
the community and family depend" on "diversity and notions of individual freedom."
Bartlett, Saving the Family from the Reformers, supra note 96, at 818.
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C. The Decline of Moral Discourse Critique
Another related theme in the work of these scholars is that moral
discourse in family law has declined and that family law has become
separated from moral concerns. Schneider's important 1985 article,
Moral Discourse and the Transformation of Family Law argues that there
is a powerful "tendency toward diminished moral discourse and trans-
ferred moral responsibility in family law.”137
 He believes that this the-
sis is supported by no-fault divorce laws," by child custody laws where
custody is no longer supposed to be awarded on the basis of a parent's
sexual behavior,'" by increased enforcement of interspousal con-
tracts,"° and by other legal phenomena."' The shift in his view was
related to a number of factors; to a large extent, he believes, moral
discourse has been replaced by psychological discourse."2 Schneider
later writes, "for some people and in some ways, morals—and thus
moral discourse—has become a diminished and disfavored category
not just in law, but in life, and . . . this change has helped impel the
law away from moral discourse." 143
 Schneider also notes an increased
skepticism toward rules and broad principles and a professed, al-
136 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803 (1985).
137 Id. at 1809. He states that there has been 	 diminution of the law's discourse in
moral terms about the relations between family members, and the transfer of many moral
decisions from the law to the people the law once regulated." Id. at 1807-08.
"8 See id. at 1810-11.
133 See id. at 1811.
140 See Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Thansformation of Family Law, supra note 136,
at 1814.
141 See id. at 1814-16.
142 See id. The factors to which he attributes the changes are the legal tradition of non-
interference in family matters, the ideology of liberal individualism, American society's
changing moral beliefs, and the rise of "psychotogic man." See id at 1808-09.
143 Schneider, Marriage and Morals, supra note 1, at 519. Schneider notes that for many,
the term 'morality' has come to have a narrow meaning, referring to traditional sexual
morality. See id. at 537-38. He notes that:
the term "moral" has in some milieux taken on a narrow—and derogatory—
meaning. "Morality" means "traditional morality" which means sexual moral-
ity. The relegation of morals to sexual morals does little to advance the dig-
nity , of moral thought, for sexual morals have come to connote a narrow,
rigid, prudish, restrictive, and repressive regime of outdated ideas hypocriti-
cally stated and heartlessly imposed .... In short, moral has come to mean
moralistic.
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though incomplete, moral relativism in students such that they are
unwilling to make moral judgments about family matters openly. 144
Glendon notes that in the United States, "secular family . . •. law
substantially refrains from articulating a common morality."' 5 Glen-
don claims that family law:
[H]as been influenced by new ideas, not about families, but
about law and morality. Such ideas include the problematic
notions that courts and legislatures should not attempt to
impose "values" (except for equality, individual liberty and
tolerance). . .. The result is often that other normative legal
propositions have tended to be phased out, even when they
are quite widely shared. 146
Hafen also seems to support the idea that moral discourse has de-
clined. 141 He notes that the legal system is generally less confident
about the normative posture of many former notions of morality and
ideal behavior, even in the context of criminal law." 48 Without being
very specific,149 these authors convey an impression of some nostalgia
for the passed time when the rules were clearer and the legal system
was more confident about rules and morality. 15°
144 See id. at 543. In his article, Marriage and Morals, supra note 1, Schneider uses the
example of the reaction of his family law students to a hypothetical of a man wanting to
leave his wife of many years for his young secretary to make various points. These points
include the idea that students view marriage as primarily a vehicle for self-fulfillment, since
few articulated any moral objections to the man leaving his marriage, and few articulated
any moral reasons why he should continue to support his spouse after marriage. See id. at
509-17. By contrast, in teaching family law at University of Maine School of Law, I have
found students articulate the opposite thoughts; that after a certain time a relationship
(married or unmarried, gay or straight) carries with it an obligation to stay, divide prop-
erty not according to title, and/or to provide ongoing support of some kind.
145 GLENDON. TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW, supra note 2, at 14.
146 Id. at 297.
147 See Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy, supra note 4, at 1-3.
"8 Id. at 5.
149 Margaret Brinig notes that "much of the communitarian literature 	 sets a mood
rather than providing an agenda." Margaret F. Brinig, Status, Contract and Covenant, 70
CORNELL L. REV. 1573, 1573 (1994) (reviewing MILTON REGAN, FAMILY LAW AND THE PUR-
SUIT OF INTIMACY (1993)).
ISO See, e.g., Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy, supra note 4, at 1-18. See generally
Schneider, Marriage and Morals, SUM note 1; GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE, supra
note 2, at 112-42.
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D. Limitations of the Decline in Moral Discourse Critique
Glendon, Schneider, and Hafen are correct that courts "are now
less likely to rely on moralistic language or moral judgments in the
entire range of family law issues, from divorce to child custody to
child neglect,"Im and in that sense moral discourse certainly has de-
clined. This does not mean, however, that moral concerns have been
exiled from family law. 152
 Instead, moral values different from those
that grounded family law in the fault divorce era increasingly animate
family law.i" These "Moral values are grounded in equality, fairness,
commitment, and nurturance" 154
 and are explored in recent scholar-
ship, discussed in this section.
For example, some recent developments in family law, such as
the societal recognition of domestic violence and the jettisoning of
archaic rules that discriminated against women, can be seen as based
on moral values that view violence within families and discrimination
against women as wrong. As Naomi Cahn writes in an instructive re-
view essay, "claims [about the decline of moral discourse] fail to rec-
ognize the 'moral values' underlying [recent] changes in family
law. "155
Cahn identifies a "new Family Morality" which "addresses family
values, promotes acceptance of broader definitions of the family, and
draws on notions of fairness and equality." 156
 Cahn argues that:
151 Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy, supra note 4, at 5. Compare In re Black, 283 P.2d
88'7 (Utah 1955) (upholding termination of parental rights of polygamous parents be-
cause of immorality of polygamous environment for children), with Sanderson v. Tryon,
739 P.2d 623 (Utah 1987) (finding that a parent's practicing polygamy, standing alone, is
insufficient to support a custody award to the non-polygamous parent).
152
 The broad question of the relationship between law and morality is beyond the
scope of this article. Very influential works include PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF
MORALS (1965) (claiming that law should be used to uphold society's moral standards in
the context of criminal laws forbidding homosexual sex); HERBERT A. HART, LIBERTY AND
MoRatrry (1963) (claiming that it is not justified to use criminal law to outlaw conduct
simply because that conduct is immoral according to common belief). For a recent argu-
ment that although law and morality overlap, moral theory has nothing to offer jurispru-
dence, See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 91-182
(1999).
155 See Bartlett, Saving the Family from the Reformers, supra note 96, at 816; Cahn, Review
Essay: The Moral Complexities of Family Law, supra note 96, at 238; Silbaugh, Family Economy,
supra note 14, at 67 n.l.
154 Cahn, Review Essay: The Moral Complexities ofFamily Law, supra note 96, at 238.
155 Id. at 244-45. Cahn notes that the decline of moral discourse and concerns over the
increased individual focus of family law raise troubling questions and that issues about
divorce and children should cause concern. See id.
156 Id. at 245.
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(t] he shift away from traditional moral discourse and toward
private contracting does not indicate diminished moral dis-
course in family law; instead, this shift represents only one of
the many different trends within family law. The new family
morality recognizes that there is, simultaneously, an increase
in new types of moral discourse in some of those same areas,
as well as the inevitable tension between private contracting
and status based assumptions) 57
Katharine Silbaugh, similarly, observes that "moral values in family law
have shifted toward equity and away from older moral values, such as
marital fault defined as infidelity."158 Lee Teitelbaum has argued that
the decline in moral discourse seems to follow from the abandonment
of "a moral theory to which the use of expressly moralistic language is
expressly suited,"159 but does not reflect "a wholesale abandonment of
morality."16° He writes of the inadequacy of rights talk in family law,
and urges consideration of ways "to talk about families as relation-
ships."161
Regan takes the position that family law should promote "a sub-
stantive moral vision of commitment and responsibility." 162 Another
scholar with strong moral concerns, Martha Minow, emphasizes issues
of obligation and moral responsibility) 63 She discusses duties at
length)" She endorses a "liberal approach to family membership but
a strict view of family obligation." 165 This scholarship shows that con-
157 Id.
158 Silbaugh, Family Economy, supra note 14, at n. L Silbaugh's article, for example, ex-
plicitly "privileges equality ... over other values, including liberty."
159 Lee Teitelbaum, Correspondence—Moral Discourse and Family Law, 84 Mimi. L. REV.
430,431 (1985).
100 Id. at 431.
161 Id. at 441. He notes that a "revised teleological view, directed to the functions and
characteristics we now value in [family] relationships, may provide one way of thinking
about these questions." Id.
165 REGAN, supra note 5, at 4.
165 Minow, All in the Family, supra note 5, at 306.
154 Id. at 325-32.
166 Minow, Redefining Families, supra note 86, at 282. Illustrating this principle, she
writes:
[I]£ someone claims family membership and the benefits that go along with
it, that person may also be said to consent to and accept the obligations that
attach to family roles. In other words, let us be welcoming toward those who
are willing to take on family obligations, but serious in enforcing the expecta-
tion that those obligations will in fact be fulfilled.
Minow, All in the Family, supra note 5, at 307..
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cerns with moral issues in family law remain strong, although these
concerns often focus on different issues than those considered over-
riding in the past.
Katharine Bartlett acknowledges problems and challenges faced
by families and articulates a "family-enabling model of reform," 186 but
avoids using moral terminology. She writes:
Family law is soaked in moral judgments that both reinforce
the law and are reinforced by it. At some level, the question
is not whether family law should reflect moral principles but
what those principles will be. When it conies to the moral
principles the state should be trying to reinforce, I favor re-
spect or moral acconnnodation for a broad range of family
forms that are capable of providing nurturing environments
to its inembers. 197
She states that "[i] 11 today's debates over the family, however,
speaking in broad moral terms is too readily associated with one set of
specific, conservative values to the exclusion of other values." 168 Since
her model accepts a wide range of family types, she "usually find[s]
moral terminology more confusing than helpful and [tries] to avoid
it."189 She argues that strengthening two-parent families is a valid pol-
icy goal since such families tend to be better for children, but that
family-standardizing reform proposals such as proposals to restrict
grounds for divorce are likely to have negative consequences for
women and children. 17°
Family law issues, like other legal issues, relate to moral ques-
tions. Family law's moral discourse has diminished in some respects
and in some contexts. But in important ways, the moral concerns of
family law have not simply declined but rather have shifted. to con-
cerns with fairness, equality, commitment and nurturing. 171
166 Bartlett, Saving the Family from the Reformers, supra note 96, at 843.
167 Id. at 816.
168 Id.
'69 Id.
17° See id. at 819-43.
171 See supra notes 155-170 and accompanying text.
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III. THE EXCLUSION OF LESBIAN AND GAY MALE COUPLES FROM CIVIL
MARRIAGE
Many lesbians and gay men are in long-term, committed couple
relationships172 and many would marry if they were not prohibited
from doing so. 175 Information from surveys of unmarried partners has
shown that about 1.7 million unmarried households "are likely to be
headed by same-sex couples." 174 Lesbian and gay male couples in the
United States have been trying to obtain recognition of their unions
as legal marriages for over twenty-five years."6 Some courts in recent
years have shown increased receptivity to such claims. 176 Most notably,
172 See Craig W. Christensen, If Not Marriage? On Securing Gay and Lesbian Family Values
by a "Simulacrum of Marriage," 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 1699, 1726-27, 1729 (1998) [hereinaf-
ter Christensen, If Not Marriage); David' L. Chambers, What If7 The Legal Consequences of
Marriage and the Legal Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. REV. 447, 449
(1996). For example, in one study, 25% of the 560 gay male couples studied and 14% of
the 706 lesbian couples studied had lived together for ten or more years. See A. Steve Bry-
and & Demian, Relationship Characteristics of Gay and Lesbian Couples: Findings from a National
Survey Cdernianebuddybuddy.com > (an academic presentation of key findings from this
survey also appears in 1(2) J. OF GAY & LESBIAN SOC. SERVS. (1994)); see also Lawrence A.
Kurdek, Lesbian and Gay Couples in LESBIAN, GAY, AND BISEXUAL IDENTITIES OVER THE
LIFESPAN: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 243, 243 (Anthony R. D'Augelli & Charlotte J.
Patterson eds., 1995) (noting survey results that between 45% and 80% of lesbians and
between 40% and 60% of gay men are currently involved in a romantic relationship). Also,
"partners hi same sex relationships score high on scales designed to measure attachment,
caring and intimacy, with scores indistinguishable from heterosexual couples." REGAN,
supra note 5, at 120.
173 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 7, at 1-4; Chambers, supra note 172, at 450 11.7; Christen-
sen, If Not Marriage, supra note 172, at 1726 11.162-63.. Not all lesbians and gay men see
marriage as an ideal model and some define family in different ways. See Christensen, Legal
Ordering, supra note 13, at 1304; see, e.g., Darren L. Hutchinson, Out Virt Unseen: A Racial
Critique of Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory and Political Discourse, 29 Corot. L. REV. 561, 591-601
(1997) (arguing that securing legal marriage for gay male and lesbian couples is a ques-
tionable goal).
174 Mary Louise Fellows et al., Committed Partners and Inheritance: An Empirical Study, 16
LAw & INEQ. 1, 2 (1998).
175 See, e.g., Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971) (stating that marriage by
same-gender couples is not marriage).
176 See Brause v. Bureau of Vital Solis., No. 3AN-95-0562 CI, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska
Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998) (holding that because the right to choose one's life partner is
fundamental, a ban on marriage by couples of the same gender must be justified by a
compelling state interest in order to be constitutional under the state constitution); Baehr
v. Miike, Civ. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996), reed and re-
manded, 994 P.2d 566 (Haw. Dec. 9, 1999) (Hawaii trial judge holds state can not forbid
marriage by saute-gender couples). In earlier proceedings in the same case, a plurality of
the Hawaii Supreme Court had held that the state's ban on marriage by same-gender cou-
ples had to be justified by a compelling state interest in order to he constitutional. See
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993), modified by 852 P.2d 74 (Haw. 1993). In No-
vember 1998, Alaska voters amended the state constitution to define marriage as between
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the Vermont Supreme Court recently held that under the Vermont
constitution, the state could not deny to same-sex couples "the com-
. mon benefit, protection and security that Vermont law provides oppo-
site-sex married couples."m The idea of marriage by same-gender
couples has encountered major legislative resistance, with numerous
states passing bans on marriage by same-gender couples in the past
five years. 178
 This section does not review the territory of whether such
statutes are constitutional. 179
 It instead examines the significance of
the exclusion from marriage and argues that marriage of same-
gender couples can foster positive connections between people and
should be allowed. 199
a man and a woman only. See Carey Goldberg, Vermont Supreme Court Takes Up Gay Marriage,
Nov. 19, 1998, N.Y.T. Abstracts 20, 1998 WL 22333334. In November 1998, Hawaii voters
passed a constitutional amendment opposing the trial court's decision. See id.
177 Baker v. Vermont, 1999 WL 1211709, at *20 (Dec. 20, 1999).
178 See Appendix: State Anti SambSex Marriage Statutes, 16 Qunsmunac L. REY. 134 (1996).
Also, although marriage is an area traditionally reserved to the states, Congress in 1997
passed the Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419, codified at 1
U.S.C. § 728, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C which for the first time created a federal definition of
marriage. Some of the states' anti-same-gender marriage statutes have been used as
authority to deny other types of connections between gay couples. For example, Arizona's
ban was used by the State Department of Corrections to justify forbidding any gay prisoner
from holding hands with, hugging or kissing his or her partner at the beginning or end of
a prison visit, although heterosexual couples were allowed such physical contact. See infra
notes 207-12 and accompanying text. Pennsylvania's law was authority for a court's conclu-
sion that two women could not adopt the biological child born to one of them. In reAdop-
tion of R.B.F. and R.C.F. (Ct. of Common Pleas of Lancaster County, Pa. Oct. 22, 1998)
(order dismissing adoption petition with prejudice).
179
 For arguments that such statutes are unconstitutional, see sources cited at supra
note 7; see also Samuel A. Marcosson, Romer and the Limits of Legitimacy: Stripping Opponents
of Gay and Lesbian Rights of their First Line of Defense" in the Same-Sex Marriage Fight, 24 1
CONTEMP. L. 217 (1998).
199
 In arguing that marriage by same-gender couples be allowed, I am not arguing that
such marriage will solve all or almost all problems faced by gay men and lesbians. As Dar-
rell Hutchinson has pointed out, for black and Latino lesbians and gay men, marriage may
not make much, or any, difference. See Hutchinson, supra note 173, at 591. Hutchinson
argues: "Because most gays and lesbians of color remain invisible and marginalized within
the larger gay and lesbian community, it is extremely unlikely that a marriage license will
close much of the gap between them and the center of a heterosexual society that is
stratified by race, class, gender, and sexuality." Id. at 591. Accepting these assertions, how-
ever, does not make the denial of marriage to same-gender couples acceptable.
Hutchinson also points out that "substantial sociological, historical, and anthropological
research demonstrates that African-American blacks, and other non-white cultures place
tremendous importance on 'extended families,' rather than rigid nuclear bodies, as a
means of social organization and child-rearing. These patterns result from economic ne-
cessity and cultural practice." Id. at 592. Assuming that this expansive generalization is
supported, it is clear that in the United States' legal system today, marriage nonetheless
plays quite an important role. See GLENDON, TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW, supra note
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A. The Expressive Function—The Story Told Law
The "story told by law" 181 about lesbian and gay coupled, commit-
ted relationships by the exclusion from marriage 182 is that they do not
exist or do not count. 183 Law tells all people that lesbians and gay men
are lone individuals 184 despite the fact that they have "fainilistic" rela-
2, at 293 (noting that law in the United States remains quite marriage-centered although
less so than in the past). The exclusion from it is thus also significant. Hutchinson further
writes, "if gay marriage does not challenge racial, class, and gender inequality, then we
should—in light of the `multilayered and synergistic' nature of sexual subordination—
continue to question its high priority and even legitimacy, as au instrument of gay and
lesbian liberation." Hutchinson, supra note 173, at 601. As discussed infra, marriage by
same-gender couples may challenge gender inequality. See infra notes 308, 315-16 and
accompanying text. I agree that marriage by saute-gender couples does not, in and of
itself, challenge class or racial inequality. Few legal reforms challenge all these forms of
inequality simultaneously, but that does not mean none should be pursued. Access to
marriage nonetheless is important, despite the acknowledgment that it is not a panacea
for inequality of various kinds, for several reasons including the following: First, marriage
recognizes important connections between people. As Robin West says, "marriage just is,
through and through, anti-individualistic. That is precisely its moral strength, and to no
small measure the source of its immense appeal." West, Universalism, supra note 122. at 729.
Second, the exclusion has negative practical consequences for many gay men and lesbians
whatever their race or class. For example, the Family and Medical Leave Act does not
require employers to provide leave so that an employee can care for his or her partner.
only for a spouse or child. See infra note 241 and accompanying text. Third, the exclusion
tells false stories about gay male and lesbian couples in committed relationships. Fourth. it
stigmatizes all gay men and lesbians. This is not to claim that there are no more severe
forms of stigma, or that all gay men and lesbians face only that stigma. Of course, racism
may be a more severe form of stigma for African-American gay men and lesbians than the
exclusion from marriage. Last, the exclusion is a denial of formal equality.
GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE. supra note 2. at 9.
Is2 The exclusion from marriage is an important exclusion. Although the legal
significance of marriage has diminished, see Mary Ann Glendon, Marriage and the State: The
Withering Away of Marriage, 62 VA. L. REV. 663, 681 (1976), our law remains quite marriage-
centered. See GLENDON, TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILYLAW. supra note 2. at 293-94.
183 Marriage has great practical significance and also has symbolic significance. See
Christensen, If Not Marriage, supra note 172, at 1746, 1783; Chambers. 117tat if?, supra note
172, at 449. Marriage law involves a panoply of legal protections and burdens. See generally
Chambers, supra note 172. A federal study by the General Accounting Office found 1040
federal statutes under which marital or spousal status affects an entitlement, right or obli-
gation. Rep. No. GA01, OCG 97-16, 1997 WL 67783 (Jan. 31, 1997). See also Fellows et al..
Committed Partners and Inheritance, supra note 174; Matthew R. Dubois, Legal Planning for
Gay, Lesbian and Non-Thaditional Elders, 63 ALBANY L. REV. 263 (2000),
• 184 Mary Ann Case has shown how in litigation of lesbian and gay issues other than
marriage cases, couples are usually absent. See Mary Arm Case, Couples and Coupling in the
Public Sphere: A Comment on the Legal History of Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 79 VA. L.
REV. 1643 (1993). She also highlights cases where an individual employee is in a same-
gender couple and open about it, and that fact is used against the employee. For a recent
example, see Shalar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997) (en bane) (upholding state
attorney general's decision to rescind job offer to female employee for participating in a
wedding ceremony with another woman). She points out that in the few cases where courts
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tionships.'" This story is both false and stigmatizing.'" The coupled,
committed relationships of lesbians and gay men are, as noted above,
"outside the law."187
 When such relationships end, through death or
breakup, it is as though they never existed. While the law is not uni-
form, there are few exceptions to this principle.'88 The intersubjectiv-
ity of lesbian and gay male couples is unrecognized, no matter how
long they have been 'together. Their interdependence, or the de-
pendence of one on another for health or other reasons, generally is
ignored. Since marriage is the quintessential, legally recognized way
for two adults to "belong" to one another, refusing to recognize com-
mitted, coupled gay relationships consigns the members of such rela-
tionships to the impoSsibility of that kind of "belonging." 189 It thus
prevents gay couples from attaining what benefits may come from
such belonging and also deprives society of the benefits that may
come from belonging. As Hafen claims, without "belonging, we may
have been able to recognize and accept a lesbian or gay couple, one of the partners is ei-
ther dead, see Braschi v. Stahl Assoc. Co., 544 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1989) (surviving partner of
deceased tenant is "family member" within meaning of rent control statute), or seriously
disabled, see In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. 1991), discussed infra
at text accompanying notes 190-200. Cheshire Calhoun aptly has observed that an impor-
tant subtext in debates about treatment of lesbian and gay male couples is the powerful
but false notion that gay men and lesbians are incapable of romantic love and commit-
ment. See Cheshire Calhoun, Making Up Emotional People: The Case of Romantic Love, in THE
PASSIONS OF LAw 3, 24 (Susan Mules, ed.) (forthcoming 1999). Law generally reflects
this. The notion that gay men and lesbians are incapable of romantic love is the flip-side of
the also incorrect notion that gay men and lesbians are defined by sexual activity, which is
discussed further at Part N.C.
188 See Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy, supra note 4, at 23.
186 See Calhoun, supra note 184 (highlighting stigmatizing conception of gay men and
lesbians as possessing an excessive and unregulated sexuality and psychological inability to
maintain stable relationships); Wriggins, Questions of Constitutionality, supra note 7, at 394-
96 (arguing that exclusion of an entire group from marriage makes a negative statement
about the group and that wholesale exclusion of gay man and lesbians from the institution,
contrasted with the relaxed treatment of entry into marriage by heterosexuals, is stigmatiz-
ing). I am not claiming that the only valid form of relationship is a marriage-like relation-
ship. A long-tern[, committed, marital relationship, however, can be a very important, chal-
lenging and satisfying part of life which brings benefits to the individuals involved, as well
as society. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 7, at 109-11; Ball, supra note 7, at 1938; Brinig,
supra note 149, at 1600.
187 See Christensen, Legal Ordering, supra note 13, at 1300-01.
Igo See, e.g., Adoption of Tammy, 416 Mass. 205, 207 (1993) (adoption by two women of
biological child of one of the women allowed); In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d
790 (Minn. 1991) (lesbian may be guardian of her severely injured and disabled partner
despite objections of injured person's parents); Biaschi v. Stahl Assoc. Co., 544 N.Y.S.2d
784 (1989) (holding that under New York rent control statute, long-term gay partner of
deceased tenant was a "family member").
189 See Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy, supra note 4, at 32.
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never know ... the reservoirs of strength and compassion we carry
within ourselves. That is a loss not only to ourselves, but a major loss
to society." While family law, as Glendon points out, in its focus on
individuals unfortunately often ignores actual intersubjectivity and
interdependence, this is even mare true with regard to gay people. 191
"Familistic relationships," in work quoted by Hafen, "involve an
intermingled and organic unity in which shared commitments of mu-
tual attachment transcend self-interest. Such interaction derives from
an unlimited personal commitment, not merely to another person
but to the good of the relationship or the family entity as a larger or-
der."192 This form of relationship, with "commitments of mutual at-
tachment [that] transcend self-interest," is not limited to heterosexual
couples. 195 Yet law generally ignores support, dependency, commit-
ments, and "familistic behavior" between members of same-gender
couples, as the following examples suggest.
The facts of In re Guardianship of Sharon Kowalski, provide an ex-
cellent illustration)" At the age of 27, Sharon Kowalski suffered se-
vere brain injuries in a car accident. As a result of the accident, she
needed to use a wheelchair for transportation and her memory and
ability to speak were impaired. 195 At the time of the accident, she had
been living, as a couple, with her lesbian partner, Karen Thompson,
for four years. 198 They had exchanged rings and named each other as
beneficiaries on their insurance policies, but Sharon's parents were
not aware of Sharon's lesbian relationship)"
After the accident, a dispute began concerning guardianship of
Sharon between Sharon's parents and Karen. 198 Eventually, in 1991,
eight years after Sharon's car accident, Karen was appointed Sharon's
190 Id. at 38-40.
191 See GLENDON, TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW, supra note 2, at 297.
192 Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy, supra note 4, at 23.
191 See REGAN, supra note 5, at 120 (moral aspiration of marriage is cultivation of a rela-
tional sense of identity not necessarily heterosexual intimacy); Ball, supra note 7, at 1936-
42 (same-sex relationships are morally good and provide means for gay and lesbian people
to connect with one another and achieve autonomy); Brinig. supra note 199, at 1600
(same-sex couples "can make the permanent commitment and exhibit the selfless loving
and giving required for a covenant"); Michael Perry, The Morality of Homosexual Conduct: A
Response to John Finnis, 9 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & Pun. Por....v 41, 55(1995) (both het-
erosexual and homosexual relationships can be lifelong, monogamous, faithful, and lov-
ing).
194 See 478 N.W.2d 790 (Mimi. 1991).
195 see id.
196
 See id.
197 See id.
1"See id. at 791-92.
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guardian. Karen Thompson's continuing devotion to her disabled
partner took many forms. Karen actively worked with Sharon three or
more days a week on Sharon's therapy and daily skills. Karen was the
only person willing to care for Sharon outside an institution, and she
built a completely handicap-accessible home in the hope that Sharon
could live there.'" Karen was the person best able to motivate Sharon
with her therapy. 2" The nitty-gritty details are striking. Karen was of-
ten "the only one who can clean Sharon's mouth and teeth, since
Sharon is apparently highly sensitive to invasion of her mouth." 201 By
contrast, none of Sharon's biological relatives could care for Sharon
outside an institution. 202 The actions taken by Karen Thompson with
respect to her partner demonstrate the existence of a "familistic" rela-
tionship. Paraphrasing Hafen, through the mutually belonging rela-
tionship between Karen and Sharon, Karen apparently found "reser-
voirs of strength and compassion" within herself that she might not
have known she had; society as well as Sharon have benefited 2 03
The situation of the couples in Vermont who are seeking to
marry also reflects devotion and commitment. For example, Lois
Farnham and Holly Puterbaugh, two of the plaintiffs in Baker v. Ver-
mont,204 have been together as a couple for more than twenty-five
years.206 Stan Baker and his partner Peter Harrigan, also plaintiffs in
Baker v. Vermont, have been together as a couple for over four years. 206
An example of the state's refusal to recognize any kind of con-
nections between gay people is the Arizona Department of Correc-
tions policy on contact between relatives during prison visitation. 207 It
allows for a "brief period of kissing and embracing for relatives and
immediate family at the start and end of each visit," but forbids such
122 See Guardianship of Sharon Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d at 793.
20 See id. at 793-94.
201 See id. at 794. The court went on to write that: "Oral hygiene is crucial to prevent
recurrence of a mouth fungus which can contribute to pain and tooth loss, further inhibit-
ing Sharon's communication skills and her ability to eat solid foods." Id.
"2 See id. at 793.
m See Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy, supra note 4, at 30. While the ultimate out
 was positive for Karen and Sharon, it took eight years to achieve. Had they been
married, Karen's appropriateness as a guardian would have been assumed.
"4 1999 MIL 1211709 (Dec. 20, 1999).
2°5 Leah Gardner, Courting the Right to Marry, VT. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1997 at 7.
206 Id. Regan also gives various examples of the commitments and bonds of gay male
and lesbian couples. See REGAN, supra note 5, at 120-21. Other examples abound. See, e.g.,
E5KRIDGE, supra mote 7, at 5-10.
207 Stephanie limes, Prison's Ban on Gay Contact Visits Challenged, TUCSON CITIZEN, Sept.
15, 1997 (mailable in 1997 WL 11147718.
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contact between same-sex partners. 208 When the policy was ques-
tioned, the Arizona Director of Corrections justified it based on the
state's ban on same-sex marriages and a statute promoting strong
families and family values. 2" The Director wrote that "any policy con-
doning homosexual activity at visitation, amid families and children,
would be contrary to state law."2" The Director also wrote that "the
Department recognizes the emotional hardships associated with hav-
ing a loved one incarcerated and the impact imprisonment has on a
family. Consequently, the Department allows limited contact between
relatives during visitation."2" However, to allow gay couples to hug or
kiss goodbye would be to "condone homosexual activity." The story
told by the state is that it is not an emotional hardship for a gay or
lesbian non-incarcerated person to have his or her loved one incar-
cerated if the loved one is of the same gender. The state sees the pris-
oner as neither a "loved one" nor a relative, so the relationship simply
does not count.212
In re Estate of Hall is an instructive example of law refusing to
recognize commitment and dependence. 2" Hall and petitioner went
through a private marriage ceremony. They commingled their funds.
"'They were dependent on each other for the maintenance and up-
keep of their home as well as daily living expenses and necessities of
life."214 Their financial obligations "also included the financial sup-
port of Hall's sister and Hall's minor son." 215 When Hall died intes-
tate, petitioner unsuccessfully sought a surviving spouse share under
Illinois law. The holding denying relief to petitioner is less important
than the facts—deep commitment demonstrated by a private mar-
riage, dependence, financial support of each other and of others. 216
298 See Letter from Terry L. Stewart, Director. Arizona Department of Corrections, to
Arizona House Representative Ken Cheuviont (Aug. 8, 1997) (on file with the author).
209 See id.
21° Id.
211 Id.
sts Also it is revealing that the Department considers hugging and kissing between gay
people to be "homosexual activity," when it seems not to consider such activities between
heterosexuals to be "heterosexual activity." See infra notes 377-87 and accompanying text.
213 See 707 N.E.2d 201	 1998).
214 Id. at 203.
215 Id.
216 Many other examples could be listed. In Rovira v. AT&T, Sandra Rovira and her
partner Marjorie Forlini had a private wedding ceremony and pooled their financial re-
sources. 817 F. Stipp. 1062, at 1064 (S.D.N.Y 1993). Rovira's children from a prior mar-
riage lived with Rovira and Forlini for ten years. Forlini died of cancer after the couple had
been together for twelve years. See id. After Forbad died, Rovira and Forlini's children ap-
plied for Sickness Death Benefits from Forlini's employer, AT&T, which were denied by
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"Familistic" relationships and relationships of mutual depend-
ence and support between coupled adults are good for society, as well
as the members of the relationship, and should be recognized and
supported by law. It is not as if every long-term committed same-
gender relationship necessarily involves "shared commitments of mu-
tual attachment [that] transcend self-interest."217
 Nor does every mar-
riage.218
 Many same-gender relationships, however, have these quali-
ties.219
 The story told by the law that such relationships do not exist is
not true and leaves the law at a dangerous disconnect from people's
lives.220
 It also stigmatizes gay and lesbian people. 221
The story of non-existence told by law has immense practical im-
plications for gay and' lesbian couples, discussed in more detail in
Parts III.B and C below. The absence of the legal ordering provided
by marriage (and divorce) means that lesbian and gay male couples
can not rely on the default mechanisms of marriage to order their
lives.222
 They live their lives as most couples do, having various under-
AT&T. The decision to deny benefits was upheld by the court. See id. In yet another exam-
ple, Sherry Barone and Cynthia Friedman had been partners for thirteen years when
Friedman found out she had cancer. They signed powers of attorney, wills, health care
directives, written instructions to carry out wishes, and so on, to ensure that Barone would
have control over, among other things, Friedman's burial. Yet, once Friedman died, the
cemetery refused to allow the inscription she had wanted, "Beloved life partner, daughter,
granddaughter, sister, and aunt." Barone had to sue in order to get the cemetery to follow
her instructions, and after a year, the cemetery relented. GRAFF, supra note 55 at 48. In
Adams u Howerton, two men, one of whom was Australian and one of whom was a U.S. citi-
zen, privately married and subsequently sought to have the Australian declared an "imme-
diate relative," so he could permanently reside in this country. See 486 F. Stipp. 1119, 1120
(C.D.Cal. 1980), affil, 673 F.2d 1036, 1038 (9th Cit 1982), cert. den., 458 U.S. 1111 (1982).
Yet the INS declared, and a federal district court affirmed, that the Australian was not an
immediate relative of the American, so that regardless of the bond between them the Aus-
tralian would not be entitled to permanent residence status. See id. In Coon u Joseph, a Cali-
fornia court held that a plaintiff who had witnessed his partner being assaulted could not
claim negligent infliction of emotional distress since he did not meet the "close relation-
ship" test required to state a claim. See 192 Cal. App. 3d 1269 (1987).
217
 Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy, supra note 4, at 23.
218 See Perry, Morality of Homosexual Conduct, supra note 193, at 56. Marriage does not
require that partners have particular financial or living arrangements, nor does marriage
law require the capacity for "familistic behavior" as a condition for entry into the institu-
tion.
211 See supra notes 196-216 and accompanying text.
220
 As Martha Minow states, "unless we stall to make family law connect with how peo-
ple really live, the law is either largely irrelevant or merely ideology: merely statements of
the kinds of human arrangements the lawmakers do and do not endorse." Minow,
Redefining Families, supra note 86, at 271.
221 See supra note 184.
222
 These include intestacy laws, spouse's elective share laws, community property laws,
laws providing for equitable distribution of marital property and alimony at divorce, and a
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standings that may change over time but no written contracts, expect-
ing never to become disabled, or break up, and not planning for
death.223 If one partner dies without a will, this results in the applica-
tion of state intestacy laws, which do not recognize same-gender part-
ners.224 If one partner becomes disabled and needs a guardian, the
other partner will not necessarily be recognized as a guardian. 225 If
such a couple breaks up and a member or members of the couple has
property, legal confusion can result about who owns what. 226 Disputes
between ex-partners may result in painfully intrusive, expensive, time-
consuming, and unpredictable litigation. 227 Both Glendon and
Schneider have noted the invasive, unpredictable, and unsatisfactory
character of the Marvin v. Marvin litigation for unmarried heterosex-
ual couples;228 the same problems arise for gay male and lesbian cou-
ples.
The story law should be telling is that coupled relationships be-
tween adults of the same gender involving "shared commitments of
mutual attachment [that] transcend self-interest" 229 are civil marriages
wide variety of other provisions. See Chambers, lihat if? supra note 172; Christensen, If Not
Marriage, supra note 172; Cluistensen, Legal Ordering, supra note 13. These provisions not
only reflect the expressive function, but also the protective function, because they are in
part aimed at protecting the economically weaker party front disadvantage caused by the
other's actions. For example, laws providing for equitable distribution of property are
aimed at dividing property in a fair Himmel; regardless of which party has title.
225 See Martha M. Ertman, contractual Purgatory far Sexual Marginorities: Not Heaven but
Not Hell Either, 73 DENv. U. L. REV. 1107,1141(1996) [hereinafter Ertman, Contractual Pur-
gatory].
224 See Fellows et al., supra note 174, at 2. Efforts to inherit through intestacy laws are
unavailing. See In re Estate of Hall, 707 N.E.2d 701 (1998) (discussed at text accompanying
notes 213-16).
225 See Guardianship of Sharon Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d 790 (Mimi. 1991), discussed at text
accompanying notes 194-216.
226 By mentioning property disputes, it is not to be inferred that all lesbians and gay
men are affluent. According to research by Professor Lee Badgett, lesbians and gay men
earn no more than heterosexual people; indeed, in some cases gay men appear to earn
less than comparable heterosexual men." M.V. Lee Badgett, Income Inflation: The Myth of
Affluence Among Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Americans, 2 NATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN TASK
FORCE POLICY INSTITUTE (1998) (visited Feb. 2, 2000) <http://www.ngltf.org/pub >.
227 See, e.g., Hanselman v. Shepardson, 1996 WL 99377 (S.D.N.'I 1996) (describing
property dispute between same-gender couple that had broken up, involving claims for
breach of contract or quasi-contract, rescission of contract, fraud, misrepresentation and
negligence). See generally Christensen, Legal Ordering, supra note 13. For disputes involving
unmarried heterosexuals who lived together and split up, compare Morone v. Morone, 413
N.E.2d 1154 (N.Y. 1980) (enforcing only express contracts), with Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394
N.E.2d 1204 (Ill, 1979) (failing to enforce even express contracts).
228 See supra notes 45-46.
229 HafC11, Individualism and Autonomy, supra note 4, at 23.
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if the members of the couple choose to make them so. 230
 Concerns
about the increased contractualization or individual. orientation of
family law, and about individuals making only limited investments in
relationships, should lead to support of marriage by same-gender
couples. Law should encourage members of married couples to be
responsible for one another and for their dependents. 231
 Marriage,
whether between opposite-gender or same-gender couples, opposes
atomism and recognizes positive, beneficial connections between
members of a couple. This is a very good thing, especially in a society
in which people (as Glendon, Schneider, Hafen, and others warn), 252
may be becoming increasingly self-oriented, less generous and less
connected to one another.
Legally recognized civil marriage is the most practical boundary
or shorthand for this goal of expressing a shared commitment, 233 be-
cause as Hafen notes, "a boundary based on the degree of commit-
ment to a relationship or individuals' expectations regarding a rela-
tionship's permanence would require intolerable inquiries into the
most private realm of individuals' lives.'"234
Moreover, in accord with the "new Family Morality" as outlined
by Cahn,235
 which is based on moral values of "equity, fairness, com-
mitment and nurturance,"236
 the expressive message that law should
be sending is that coupled, intimate, same-gender, committed rela-
tionships exist and are positive for the individuals involved as well as
for society. Allowing such marriage does not require a radical
redefinition of the family, but rather simply a fair expansion of those
230
 And, of course, provided they meet other requirements of marriage, such as being
of age and not already being married. The Vermont Supreme Court's decision in Baker u
Vermont acknowledges that the extension of marriage to same-gender couples is a matter of
recognizing commitment and, at a deeper level, commonality between human beings. The
court wrote "[t] he extension of the Common Benefits Clause to acknowledge plaintiffs as
Vermonters who seek nothing more, nor less, than legal protection and security for their
avowed commitment to an intimate and lasting human relationship is simply, when all is
said and done, a recognition of our common humanity." Baker v. Vermont, 1999 WL
1211709, at *23.
231 See supra Part II.D; Minow, Redefining Families, supra note 86, at 282 (arguing that law
should be flexible regarding entry into families but should enforce family duties).
232 See supra Part ILA; supra note 4. Crucially, nothing about 'belonging" is inherently
heterosexual.
235 See Bartlett, Saving the Family from the Reformers, supra note 96, at 815-16 (noting that
marriage remains an important ideal).
234 Hafen, Constitutional Status, supra note 4, at 487. See Christensen, Legal Ordering, su-
pra note 13, at 1321-22.
233 Cahn, Review Essay: The Moral Complexities of Family Lau), supra note 96, at 245.
276 Id. at 238.
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entitled to tnarry.237 As Regan says in support of marriage by same-
gender couples, "the moral aspiration that marriage has expressed is
not heterosexual intimacy per se, but the more general vision of re-
sponsibility based on the cultivation of a relational sense of iden-
tity."238
B. The Facilitative, Protective, and Dispute Resolution Functions
Three of the most important functions of family law are the pro-
tective, facilitative, and dispute resolution functions. 239 By excluding
gay people from marriage, the law performs these functions less effec-
tively than if lesbian and gay male couples were allowed to marry.
The facilitative function "help[s] people organize their lives and
affairs in the ways they prefer."240 Many of the laws concerning mar-
riage perform a facilitative function. 241, These range widely. For exam-
ple, the Family and Medical Leave Act requires employers to offer
unpaid leave of up to twelve weeks annually to a qualified employee to
care for a spouse with a serious health problem. 242 Leave is also al-
lowed for an employee to care for parents and children but not for
anyone else. Taxation provisions allow spouses to transfer property
between themselves without subjecting them to gift tax. 243 These types
of provisions facilitate couples' financial and personal bonds, encour-
aging mutual care, dependence, and support. Lesbian and gay male
couples are left out of these facilitative provisions.
237 Indeed, one need not embrace the entire "new Family Morality" outlined by Cahn
in order to recognize marriage by same-gender couples.
2" REGAN, supra note 5, at 120.
2" Schneider, The ChannellingFunction, supra note 1, at 497. 505-06.
242 Id. at 497.
241 Chambers, That if?, supra note 172, at 485. Many elements of law have overlapping
functions. For example, the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611,
2612(a) (1) (c) (1994), has a facilitative function in that it helps employees care for sick
relatives without losing their jobs. It also has an expressive function, in the limitations it
sets on who can care for whom; part of its expressive message is that gay couples' relation-
ships do not count.
212See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611, 2612(a) (1)(c).
243 To take a concrete example, if a gay person owns a house, then fails in love with
someone, the partner moves into the house, and the homeowner puts the house in joint
tenancy to reflect the couple's closeness and financial intertwinedness, this could be a
taxable gift by the original homeowner to the new joint tenant. See 26 U.S.C. § 2503
(1994). On the same facts, if the couple consisted of opposite sex partners, they got mar-
ried and the homeowner put the house in joint tenancy, this would not be a taxable gift.
The gay person's situation is treated the same as if a person owns a house, and puts a
stranger on the deed. 26 U.S.C. § 2503 (1994). See BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN,
FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND Girrs 1 123.3, P-123-5(2) (2d. ed. 1993).
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But the facilitative function, for Schneider, also is concerned with
individual ordering. As Schneider notes, law's facilitative function "of-
fer[s) people the law's services in entering and enforcing contracts, by
giving legal effect to their private arrangements."244
Given the exclusion from marriage, gay male and lesbian couples
can attempt to order their material arrangements through individual
devices such as wills or written contracts and try to rely on family law's
facilitative function in enforcing contracts and giving effect to inten-
tions. Certainly a will is a good idea, but many people can not afford
the usual legal fees, and wills are sometimes challenged by family
members.245 Contracts between members of gay couples may or may
not be enforceable.245 Moreover, as Craig Christensen has shown, the
panoply of legal responsibilities and benefits afforded by marriage
can not be constructed from individuals' contracts. 247
In addition, as Hafen, Schneider, Glendon, and others have ar-
gued,245 the move to contract in family law is not an unmitigated
good. 249 Ordering intimate relationships through bargained-for con-
tracts may protect the more powerful personm and encourage the
244 Schneider, The Channelling Function, supra note 1, at 497.
245 GRAFF, supra note 55, at 49.
246 See Christensen, If Not Marriage, supra note 172, at 1733 11.213; Christensen, Legal
Ordering, supra note 13, at 1341, 1344-1347; El -titian, Contractual Purgatory, supra note 223,
at 1138. Ertman notes that it seems that the best way to maximize the likelihood of judi-
cial enforcement of gay couples' cohabitation contracts is to expressly formulate them as
business agreements omitting any mention of the parties' relationship.' Ertman, Contrac-
tual Purgatory, supra note 223, at 1138. See, e.g., Posik v. Layton, 695 So.2d 759 (Fla. Dist.
App. 1907) (holding enforceable a written agreement providing that if Posik breached
agreement she would pay Layton $2500 per month for rest of Layton's life), Crooke v.
Gilden, 414 S.E.2d 645 (Ga. 1992) (upholding contract between lesbian couple for joint
ownership and division of real property, reversing trial court's decision that contract was
void because parties' 'illegal and immoral' sexual relationship implicitly was part of con-
tract).
247 Ciuistensen, If Not Marriage, supra note 172, at 1733-34; Christensen, Legal Ordering,
supra note 13, at 1321-22. Even when members of a couple contract with each other, this
does not change the couple's situation in relation to third parties. For example, as Chris-
tensen points out, an individual may try and negotiate with his employer to have the em-
ployer pay for the health insurance of the life partner, but this is unlikely to be successful.
See id. at 1346. Ertman argues that enforcement of gay couples' contracts is better than
nothing; this is not disputed. Ertman, Contractual Purgatory, supra note 223, at 1110.
248 See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
242 But see Scott, Relational Contract, supra note 1; Ertnian, Commercializing Marriage, su-
pra note 86.
250 See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text; Fellows et al., Committed Partners and
Inheritance, supra note 174, at 19-22; Silbaugh, Family Economy, supra note 14, at 134. The
facilitative function of enforcing contracts stands in some tension with the aspect of the
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parties to think in self-oriented, rather than familistic terms. 251
Moreover, it is impractical and undesirable for gay male and lesbian
couples to have to order their lives together by written contracts. 252
Thus, this aspect of the facilitative function does not substitute for
marriage.
Regarding the protective function, several things should be ac-
knowledged. First, family law in general does not fUlfill the protective
function particularly wel1. 255 Second, most states' laws about domestic
violence, a classic example of the current protective function, 254 do
not exclude gay or lesbian couples. 255 Reports exist that gay and les-
bian victims of domestic violence often do not get effective help
through the court system even when the laws cover their situation. 256
Perhaps marriage by same-gender couples would persuade judges and
other court personnel to take such abuse more seriously. 257
protective function, which is supposed to protect against economic harms, in view of une-
qual bargaining power between parties.
25' See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
252 See Christensen, If Not Marriage, supra note 172, at 1733; Christensen, Legal Ordering,
supra note 13, at 1344-47.
255 Domestic violence "is a societal problem of epidermic proportions." Deborah Goel-
man & Roberta Valente, When Will They Ever Learn? Education to End Domestic Violence: A Law
School Report 1, ABA Commission on Domestic Violence (1997). The exact incidence of
domestic violence is impossible to determine, but it is common, KATHERINE T. BARTLETT
& ANGELA HARRIS, GENDER AND LAW: THEORY. DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 561-565 (2d ed.
1998). Abuse of children is also a major problem. See Amy Snide'', In Search of Affirmative
Duties Toward Children under a Post-DeShaney Constitution, 139 U. PA. L. REA'. 227 (1990).
254 See Schneider, The ChannellingFunction, supra note 1, at 497.
255 See Sandra E. Lundy, Abuse That Darr Not Speak its Name: Assisting Victims of Lesbian
and Gay Domestic Violence in Massachusetts, 28 NEw. ENO. L. REV. 273, 292 n.105 (1994).
Some states' statutes, however, apply only to heterosexual couples. See id. In addition, prob-
lems initially arose with some statutes' application to gay and lesbian Couples. For example,
prior to statutory amendments, Maine's law stated that one could seek a protective order if
the parties were or had been "spouses or living as spouses." A trial judge dismissed a com-
plaint by a lesbian against her allegedly abusive partner, reasoning that because lesbians
could not marry one another they could not live "as spouses." Thus, the alleged victim
could not seek relief under the statute. Sax v. Bowler, No. 87—CV—PA-697 (Maine Dist. Ct.
Dec. 1, 1987) (order dismissing complaint). But see State v. Hadinger, 573 N.E.2d 1191.
1192 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (holding that two people of the same gender can be living "as
... spouse [s] " with one another for purposes of application of the (domestic violence stat-
ute).
256 See generally Lundy, Abuse that Dare Not Speak its Name, supra note 255.
257 It may seem somewhat smprising to bring up domestic abuse in the context of mar-
riage and to speculate that marriage may increase sensitivity to domestic abuse, given the
history of ignoring abuse in marriage. Marriage does not provide an excuse for ignoring
abuse, however, and perhaps recent increased awareness of dynamics within relationships
may make courts more responsive when a gay married partner abuses his or her spouse. As
Hafen notes, "the new skepticism about relationships of dependency has exposed certain
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Another aspect of the protective function is "protecting people
from economic harms and psychological injuries."258 State interven-
tion to protect from such injuries in an ongoing marriage is, and
should be, rare. 259
 Current divorce law is not an inspiring model of
protections against economic harms or psychological injuries. 260
Nonetheless, the mechanisms of alimony and equitable distribution of
property provide the potential for some protection, at least, for the
economically weaker party. 261 By contrast, where there is no marriage,
there is no mechanism to seek long-term or short-term support for a
dependent party when a relationship ends. There is no practical
mechanism to distribute real property between the title holder and
the other partner.262
Regarding dispute resolution, procedural and substantive assis-
tance are both lacking. The vast majority of states now have laws that
either require or recommend mediation for family disputes. 263 Family
law is the area in which mediation is most frequently mandated. 284 No
mediation process exists for property or custody disputes between
same-gender couples, and the legal principles available for married
couples to deal with inequality in ownership of property when a rela-
tionship breaks up are absent. The legal system should be available if
patterns of abuse and domination that cried out for closer public and legal scrutiny."
Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy, supra note 4, at 38.
266
 Schneider, The ChannellingFunction, supra note 1, at 497.
269 See Baker, supra note 124. at 1535-38 (describing reasons law generally should not
intervene in ongoing horizontal relationships).
266
 Numerous scholars have written about how divorce, for example, does not protect
the less economically powerful spouse. See, e.g., MARTHA F. FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF
EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM (1991); Erman, Commercial-
izing Marriage, supra note 86, at 17-22, 31; Schneider, The Channelling Function, supra note
1, at 497.
"I It is difficult to analyze how current divorce law protects from psychological inju-
ries. Although it was hoped that no-fault divorce would reduce the acrimony in divorces, it
is not clear if that has taken place. Spouses now often can sue after marriage for torts such
as intentional infliction of emotional distress during the marriage. See Hakkila v. Hakkila,
812 P.2d 1320, 1326-27 (N.M. 1991); McCoy v Cooke, 419 N.W.2d 44, 46 (Mich.
App. 1988); Courtney v. Courtney, 413 S.E.2d 418, 420 (W. Va. 1991); Stuart V. Stuart, 421
N.W.2d 505 (Wisc. 1988). It is not clear, however, if that threat serves as a deterrent and
thus protects against psychological injuries.
262 See Chambers, 117tat If?, supra note 172, at 478-83.
263 See NANCY H. ROGERS & CRAIG A. McEwtx, MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY AND PRAC-
TICE App. B, Cum. Stipp. 149-251 (2d. ed. 1998).
20 See id. § 7.01, ch. 7 p. 4.
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a relationship breaks tip to ensure that the less powerful party is pro-
tected. 265
C. The Channelling Function
According to Schneider, the channelling function works through
social institutions, "which are thought to serve desirable ends," such
as marriage. 266 The institutions used in channelling "necessarily have
normative components."267 Not being allowed to be part of an institu-
tion is a channelling mechanism in itself; being treated as a legal
stranger to one's mate is an example of law's channelling function in
actio n.268
Channelling institutions create clear boundaries and impose ex-
pectations, providing useful models for people and sparing people
the necessity of making up rules and institutions from scratch. 269 To
illustrate this, Schneider invokes the image of "two nineteen-year-olds
living in a state of nature who find themselves in love," and discusses
how marriage customs and law in the mid-twentieth century would
guide, but not coerce, them.2" He does not identify the race or gen-
der of the nineteen-year-olds. But he seems to be assuming that they
are of different genders, since two nineteen-year-olds of the same
gender who found themselves in love in the mid-twentieth century
would not have been provided guidance from law or custom about
what to do to live out their love.2" He also seems to be assuming that
265 There are major issues about how well the law currently performs this function in
the context of divorce. It is designed, however, more for that function than the law con-
cerning strangers. See supra note 260.
' Schneider, The ChannellingFunction, supra note 1, at 498.
267 See id. at 529.
266 See id. at 510.
265 See id. at 507-11.
270 Id. at 508.
271 Two nineteen-year-olds of the same gender who found themselves in love in the
►id-twentieth century indeed would be likely to have had a difficult time acting on their
feelings. The 1950s were the heyday of the psychiatric notion that homosexuality was sick.
For example, in 1952 the American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistic Manual,
Mental Disorders (DSM-l) listed homosexuality as a sociopathic personality disturbance. NEIL.
MILLER, OUT OF THE PAST: GAY AND LESBIAN HISTORY FROM 1869 TO THE PRESENT 249
(1995). During that period, gays were frequently dismissed from government and other
jobs simply because of their homosexuality (or suspicions of same) and there was an "at-
mosphere of persecution and purge nationwide." Id. at 271. Given the situation in the
1950s, the hypothetical same-gender nineteen-year-olds might simply have been isolated
and not fallen in love. In The ChannellingFnnction, Schneider discusses a hypothetical legis-
lator who posits a "normative model of 'marriage' with several fundamental characteristics.
It is monogamous, heterosexual, and permanent." Schneider, The Channelling Function,
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they are of the same race, because an interracial couple in the mid-
1950s probably could not marry legally, and even if they could, cus-
tom would impose severe sanctions on the couple.272 Channelling
thus works not to urge any two hypothetical nineteen-year-olds into
the tried-and-true positive institution of marriage, but only certain
nineteen-year-olds deemed by law and custom to be suitable for one
another. This is not very different from what Schneider says the chan-
nelling function does,273
 but it illustrates that examples of channelling
which are assumed at first to represent general guidance toward a
general good actually may be founded on unspoken but strictly en-
forced exclusions and coercion.
In discussing the workings of the channelling function, Schnei-
der analogizes marriage to tennis, pointing out that participants in
tennis benefit from rules already being in place and that participants
•
supra note 1, at 500-01. The legislator writes "standards" for entry into marriage "which
prohibit homosexual unions," Id. at 502. Thus, it appears that the two nineteen-year-olds
are intended to be of different genders.
272
 In 1955, "[adore than half of the States of the Union [had] miscegenation stat-
utes." Naim v. Nairn, 87 S.E.2d 749, 753 (Va. 1955). In the 1950s, Alabama, for example,
still criminally prosecuted violations of its miscegenation statute and Virginia still enforced
its prohibitions. Peter Wallenstein, Race, Marriage, and the Law of Freedom: Alabama and Vir-
ginia 1860s-1960s, 70 CHI. KENT L. REV. 371, 412, 416 (1994). Gunnar Myrdal in 1944
noted the centrality of the bans on racial intermarriage for the system of white supremacy.
GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 606 (1944). Arnold Rose, in his official sum-
mary of Myrdal's book, wrote "[e]ven.
 in the northern states where, for the most part, in-
termaniage is not barred by law, mixed couples are punished by nearly complete social
ostracism." ARNOLD Rosa, THE NEGRO IN AMERICA 22 (1948); see also Morgan, supra note •
128 (describing prosecutions of prominent champion black boxer Jack Johnson in 1920s
for violation of Mann Act because lie married white women and hired white women prosti-
tutes). The idea of black men socializing with white women has continued past the 1950s
to be racially charged for many. For example, in 1981 a black man in Alabama was
lynched; suggestions were made in the community that he Was killed for socializing with
white women or was mistaken for a co-worker who socialized with white women. N.Y.
TIMES, July 28, 1981, at Al2, col. 6. Three white men arrested for the murder were re-
leased after a grand jury refused to issue indictments. Id. at Al2, col. 6. Given the barriers
of racism, racist violence and segregation of the 1950s, the hypothetical nineteen-year-olds
might well never have met Or fallen in love. And if the hypothetical nineteen-year-olds
were of different races and of the same gender, their romance seems even less likely.
273
 Sclmeider notes that "channelling's worth in any particular instance will depend on
the specific institutions it supports. Even if an institution serves the function's ends well, it
must be evaluated in terms of all its social consequences." Schneider, The Channelling Func-
tion, supra note 1, at 522. The major mechanisms of channelling to him are to create social
institutions and to channel people into them through several methods. One method is
recognizing and endorsing the institution; another is rewarding participation in an institu-
tion; a third is disfavoring competing institutions; a fourth is penalizing non-use of an in-
stitution. See id. at 503-04. "By and large, then, the channelling function does not primarily
use direct legal coercion." Id. at 504.
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who try and make up rules from scratch would be less likely to invent
as good a game as that which already exists. "'Tennis, in other words,
succeeds because it is a shared and well-established institution. Mar-
riage and parenthood benefit from that same fact." 274 This analogy
highlights the benefit of having rules, which of course are consider-
able,275 but provides no way of thinking about whether the actual
rules are fair or otherwise beneficia1. 278 Schneider is correct to note
that family•law institutions have a normative component and inevita-
bly channel (or attempt to channel) people in certain directions. 277
The structure of excluding gay male and lesbian couples from
marriage may be seen as trying to channel people who have a same-
gender sexual orientation into either marrying someone of the oppo-
site gender or into spending their lives without a mate. Regarding the
first option, as Mark Strasser points out, "it is unlikely that a marriage
between an individual with a same-sex orientation and an individual
with an opposite-sex orientation would be happy or stable."278 Un-
happy and unstable marriages tend not to be good for the partici-
pants or the wider society and are likely to end up as divorces, which
can have their own negative consequences. 279 Thus, if this is what the
channelling function is trying to do, it is not a sensible goal. Regard-
ing the second option, of channelling gay men and lesbians into per-
petually single lives, this seems counterproductive given the positive
consequences that intimate, stable relationships have for couples, and
thus for society as a whole, regardless of gender. 289
274 Schneider, The Channelling Function, supra note 1, at 511.
275 See supra notes 250-62 and accompanying text (pointing out importance of statu-
tory mechanisms such as equitable property distribution, alimony, and alternative dispute
resolution).
276 See Baker, Property Rules, supra note 124, at 153 n.159 (discussing Schneider's tennis
game analogy and showing that fact that a game has rules does not mean that rules are fair
or equally challenging to all participants). In the case of marriage law historically, the rules
have been tremendously unfair to women. See supra notes 108-130 and accompanying text.
Currently, marriage laws are tremendously unfair to gay men and lesbians.
277 See, e.g., Bartlett, Saving the Family from the Reformers, supra note 96, at 816 (noting
that family law is infused with moral concerns).
278 STRASSER, supra note 7, at 72.
279 See Bartlett, Saving the Family from the Reformers, supra note 96, at 819-22 n.124 (re-
viewing scholarship about divorce and its correlations with child poverty and other nega-
tive factors).
280 As the Vermont Supreme Court wrote, 'Nile state's interest in extending official
recognition and legal protection to the professed commitment of two individuals to a last-
ing relationship of mutual affection is predicated on the belief that legal support of a cou-
ple's commitment provides stability for the individuals, their family, and the broader
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The current channelling also makes no sense because it treats so
differently relationships that are the same or equivalent. 281 Intimate,
committed, coupled, same-gender relationships should be treated the
same by law, in that participants in them should be able to marry, for
numerous reasons. First, they are subjectively the same (or equiva-
lent) to the participants. They should be valued for the same reasons
that marriages are valued. Various types of marriage relationships are
valued in this society.282
 As Carlos Ball points out, "the normative
value of a committed homosexual relationship is just as high—the af-
fection, the love, the fidelity, the commitment are the same as in a
committed heterosexual relationship."283
 In addition to being morally
good, long-term intimate dependent or interdependent relationships
also can have positive instrumental consequences: they can foster in-
dividuals' stability and health, 284
 Healthy, happy, stable, supported in-
dividuals in turn tend to contribute more to communities than do
unhealthy, unhappy individuals. Resource-pooling by couples is help-
ful for economic independence and stability for the couple (and
hence for the community) because of the economies of scale in-
volved. In a committed couple relationship, where one partner be-
comes ill, the other partner often cares for the ill partner, providing
family care that does not need to be provided by the state. 285 This
benefits both the individuals involved and the state. Moreover, full
inclusion of gay couples in society will further full participation by gay
people in society which is a worthwhile goal. 286 A society where people
are disconnected from one another is a society in danger of disinte-
conm lllll ity." Baker v. Vermont, 1999 WL 1211709, at *20 (Dec. 20, 1999); see Baker, supra
note 124, at 1530-38; Becker, Two are Better; supra note 82; GRAFF, supra note 55, at 45-48.
231 See Ball, supra note 7, at 1938.
282 See Hafer, Constitutional Status, supra note 4, at 490 (noting variety of acceptable
family forms).
288
 Ball, supra note 7, at 1938.
284 See GRA F F , supra note 55, at 45-48. See generally REGAN, supra note 5; Becker, ?is are
Better; supra note 82.
288
 GLENDON, TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW, supra Dote 2, at 307 (noting that
much care of dependents is provided within the family); see, e.g., In re Guardianship of
Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. 1991).
286 Carlos Ball has thoughtfully written of perfectionist liberal theory as providing a
discourse favoring marriage by same-gender couples. See Ball, supra note 7. Linda McClain
also recently made an argument for toleration as respect, which argues that the "prohibi-
tion of same-sex marriage imposes an intolerant, unjust, and sectarian governmental or-
thodoxy about gender." McClain, supra note 7, at 121.
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gration; law plays an important role in furthering and supporting
connections between people.287
Gay couples currently are unable to reproduce biologically with
one another. Yet this should not be a basis for the law's current chan-
nelling activity. 288 The United States Supreme Court has made clear
that reproduction is not critical to marriage. 289 In Turner v. Safley,298
which dealt with constitutionality of marriage restrictions on prison
inmates, the Supreme Court discussed what attributes of marriage
remained after taking into account incarceration:
plumate marriages, like others, are expressions of emo-
tional support and public commitment. These elements are
an important and significant aspect of the marital relation-
ship. In addition ... the commitment of marriage may be an
exercise of religious faith as well as an expression of personal
dedication. Third, most inmates eventually will be released
by parole or commutation, and therefore most inmate mar-
riages are formed in the expectation that they ultimately will
be consummated. Finally, marital status often is a precondi-
tion to the receipt of government benefits . . . property
rights ... and other, less tangible benefits.m
287 GLENDON, TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW, supra note 2, at 306-13. As Schneider
says, If] or people to be Moved to help each other, they need some sense of commonality
with them—some sense that their fellow citizens are people like themselves, whose experi-
ences, concerns, and interests there= at least understand and to some degree share. So-
cial institutions help provide such a sense." Schneider. Channelling Function, supra note 1, at
511. Extending this observation, the exclusion from marriage reduces the "sense of com-
monality" that heterosexuals otherwise might feel with gay men and lesbians. Glendon
notes that the extent of law's influence is difficult to measure. It is easy to exaggerate law's
influence, yet that influence is significant and must not be ignored. See GLENDON, TRANS-
FORMATION OF FAMILY LAW, supra note 2, at 311-13. Schneider also notes the difficulty of
measuring the consequences of legal programs. See Schneider, Channelling Function, supra
note 1, at 521-22.
288 For example, hi Hafen's discussion of "belonging," there is no requirement that the
"belonging" be rebted to procreation, although of course often it is related to parenting
and children. See Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy, supra note 4. He writes that the lack
of "belonging" and the demands it makes, are "a major loss to society," but procreation is
not a necessary or sufficient condition for belonging. See id. at 41.
289 For example, in Griswold u Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). the Supreme Court de-
cided that the state could not bar access of married couples to contraceptives, thus show-
ing that the state could not decide that procreation was essential to marriage.
290
 482 U.S. '78 (1987).
291
 482 U.S. at 96.
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Moreover, childless heterosexual couples are recognized as fully mar-
ried292 as are infertile or elderly couples who marry.293 Many gay cou-
pies raise children whether they are from prior relationships or come
into the family through adoption or assisted conception. 294 As Craig
Christensen has shown, marriage would benefit these children. 295 We
are past the time, if indeed there ever was such a time, when unitary
principles can be applied in all circumstances to all marriages. The
normative goals of marriage generally are furthered by extending
marriage to same-gender couples.
Perhaps the idea is that channelling everyone into heterosexual
marriage or life without a mate is a good thing because same-gender,
intimate, committed, couple relationships`are immoral and, there-
fore, should be discouraged by family law's mechanisms. 297 Same-
292 See Hafen, Constihttional Status, supra note 4, at 490 (noting variety of acceptable
family forms hicluding childless marriages). Glendon has proposed that there should be a
particular set of divorce rules designed for childless couples where marriages of short du-
ration end. See GLF.I.irFoN, ABORTION AND DIVORCE, supra note 2, at 103.
293 There is a scholarly debate about the ethical and moral significance of sexual activ-
ity between heterosexual married members of a sterile couple as compared to the ethical
and moral significance of sex between members of a gay male or lesbian couple. See, e.g.,
Stephen Macedo, Homosexuality and the Conservative Mind, 84 GEO. 14. 261, 287 (1995)
(arguing that there is no significant ethical difference between the two situations.); Gerald
Bradley Robert P. George, Marriage and the Liberal Imagination, 84 GEO. U. 301 (1995)
(arguing that justifying point of sexual relations between spouses is not pleasure or expres-
sions of feeling but is intrinsic good of marriage considered as one-flesh communion of
spouses actualized by acts which, qua reproductive acts, unite spouses biologically); Patrick
Lee & Robert P. George, What Sex Can Be: Self-Alienation, Illusion, or OneFlesh Union, 42 AM.
J. Jutus. 135, 150 (1997) (arguing that heterosexual couples "who engage in a reproduc-
tive type act, truly become one body, one organism," and that this difference between het-
erosexual sex and homosexual sex is morally significant); John M. Ennis, Law Morality,
and "Sexual Orientation," 69 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 1049, 1066 (1994) (arguing that "union
of reproductive organs of husband and wife unites theth biologically, and this unites them
personally, whereas gay couples' sexual activity can not make them a biological and there-
fore a personal unit"); Koppelman, Is Marriage Inherently Heterosexual?, supra note 21, 51,
62-95 (arguing that even if marriage is noninstrumental good, it is not necessarily hetero-
sexual and couples do not need to engage in "sexual acts of the reproductive kind" in or-
der to realize its goods).
294 See Christensen, If Not Marriage, supra note 172, at 1759-68; Christensen, Legal Or-
dering, supra note 13.
295 Christensen, If Not Marriage, supra note 172, at 1759-68, Cluistensen, Legal Order-
ing, supra note 13. The trial court in Baehr TA Miike came to a similar conclusion. See Civ. No.
91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996).
2" As Schneider writes, doubt that you can go home again, and even if you could, I
doubt you would enjoy it." Schneider, Moral DiSCOU rse, supra note 1, at 1808.
297 This notion is basically equivalent to the argument that gay people, by seeking ac-
cess to marriage, are "repudiating morality," made by Wardle in Efforts to Legitimate, supra
note 19. This argument is discussed in more detail in Part IV.C, infra.
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gender relationships, however, are not immoral and in fact can be
normatively good.298 The current channelling of gay people into ei-
ther perpetually single lives or heterosexual marriage is therefore
both counterproductive and destructive, because it discourages nor-
matively good relationships. Family law models that are rooted in
moral concerns, such as Bartlett's, Cahn's, Minow's, and Regan's, all
support marriage by same-gender couples. 299
IV. ARGUMENTS AGAINST ALLOWING MARRIAGE BY SAME-GENDER
COUPLES AND RESPONSES TO THESE ARGUMENTS
Those opposed to marriage by same-gender couples would likely
respond that the current story of non-recognition is exactly the "story
that should be told by law." Law should "channel" people into hetero-
sexual marriage. The question remains as to why law should tell this
story; why should this channelling be attempted, given all the obser-
vations that have been made above? There is a growing literature on
this topic.") This section will discuss several arguments recently made
against marriage by same-gender couples, 5c" and will oppose those
298 See REGAN, supra note 5, at 120; Ball, supra note 7, at 1936-1942; Brinig, supra note
149, at 1600; Michael Perry, The Morality of Homosexual Conduct: A Response to John Finnis. 9
NOTRE DAME J. L. Entries & Pus. POL'Y 41, 55 (1995). See Part IV.0 for further discussion.
299 Bartlett writes that "reforms such as gay and lesbian marriage, are also support-
able" within her "family-enabling model of reform." Bartlett, Saving the Family from the Re-
formers, supra note 96, at 854. Cahn's idea of a "new Family Morality," based on values of
commitment, caring and equity, recognizes that efforts to allow sante-gender couples to
marry "reflect the importance and value of marriage and represent efforts to strengthen,
not undermine the institution." Cahn, Review Essay.' The Moral Complexities of Family Law,
supra note 96, at 246. Minow's idea that we should create welcoming rules governing entry
into families and be strict about enforcing family responsibilities, leads to allowing gay
men and lesbians to be family members. Minow, All in the Family, supra note 5, at 307; Mi-
now, Redefining Families, supra note 86, at 280-82. Regarding the view that gay men and
lesbians should be excluded from family membership, she writes, "[i]t will not do ... to
support this view by reference to nature, convention. or even religion, Many religions are
themselves struggling with these questions. Some are performing marriages of gays and
lesbians, and some are ordaining gay and lesbian clergy Minow, All in the Family, supra note
5, at 283.84. Regan's retooled status-based model of marriage calls for recognition of mar-
tinge by same-gender couples. See REGAN, supra note 5, at 120,
3°° See supra notes 7, 21 and 193. For scholarship opposed to marriage by same-gender
couples, see, for example, Bradley & George. supra note 293; David Orgon Coolidge, Same-
Sex Marriage? Baehr v. Miike and the Meaning of Marriage, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 1 (1997); F 's,
Lady Morality and "Sexual Orientation," supra note 293; Lee & George, Illhat Sex Can Be. su-
pra note 293; Raymond O'Brien, Single-Gender Marriage: A Religious Perspective, 7 TEMP. Pot...
& Crv. R-rs. L. REV. 429 (1998); Wardle, Efforts to Legitimate, supra note 19; Lynn D. Wardle,
A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 BYU L. Km 1.
501 Lynn Wardle makes these arguments against same-gender marriage in Efforts to Le-
gitimate, supra note 19.
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arguments with points developed in the preceding section. One is
that the effort to broaden access to marriage is actually a retreat from
marriage."2
 The second is that heterosexual marriage necessarily has
greater potential for benefiting individuals and society than does
marriage by same-gender couples."' Third is the argument that ef-
forts to seek same-gender marriage are a repudiation of morality.'"
A. The Argument that the Effort to Allow Same-Gender Couples to Marry Is
Actually a Retreat from Marriage
Lynn D. Wardle argues that the effort to extend marriage to
same-gender couples actually is an effort to retreat from marriage." 5
The couples over the last twenty-nine years who have gone first to
town clerk's offices and then to court to try to get married would dis-
pute this. Contrary to Wardle's contention, the effort to broaden ac-
cess to marriage is not an effort to retreat from it. The couples in-
volved are trying to have their intimate, committed relationships
recognized by the state through marriage. As Naomi Cahn has
pointed out, the efforts to allow same-gender partners to marry
"reflect the importance and value of marriage and represent attempts
to strengthen, not undermine, the institution."'" The efforts through
the courts have not sought a particular type of marriage, but just ac-
cess to marriage, with the same responsibilities and rights as everyone
else.
Wardle notes that some writers advocating marriage by same-
gender couples have called for changing marriage,"7 as if that means
that they want to retreat from it."' He cites one writer who argues that
"legalizing same-sex unions might even transform marriage into a
state divested of its sexist base. "3" Some of the historical sexist basis of
302 See infra Part N.A.
303 See infra Part W.B.
3" See infra Part W.C.
303 Wardle, Efforts to Legitimate, supra note 19, at 758. He claims that "[flu reality, it is a
profound, but subtle and disarming, rejection of marriage." Id.
306 Calm, Review Essay: The Moral Complexities of Family Law; supra note 96, at 246.
307 See Wardle, Efforts to Legitimate, supra note 19, at 758.
308 Marriage has changed constantly over the centuries. Mary Ann Glendon calls it a
"polymorphous and mutable institution." GLENDON, TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW,
supra note 2, at 4; see supra note 55.
309 Id., citing Nancy Polikoff citing Thomas Stoddard, Why Gay People Should Seek the
Right to Marry, in LESBIAN AND GAY MARRIAGE: PRIVATE COMITMENTS, PUBLIC CEREMO-
NIES 13,14-16 (Suzanne Sherman ed., 1992).
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marriage has been discussed above,"° and if marriage by same-gender
couples makes marriage less sexist, this is a good thing. As Schneider
notes, simply because the institution of marriage is "developing, does
not mean that [its] normative core will disappear." 311
Loud calls for changing marriage have been heard in our na-
tion's history. For example, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, in her famous
Address to the Legislature of the State of New York, in 1854, stated:
Look at the position of woman as wife. Your laws relating to
marriage—founded as they are on the old common law of
England, a compound of barbarous usages, but partially
modified by progressive civilization—are in open violation of
our enlightened ideas of justice, and of the holiest feelings
of our nature."2
While advocating radical changes in marriage laws, Stanton was not
advocating a retreat from marriage. Marriage and marriage law have
been constantly changing, and seemingly fundamental aspects of both
have changed." 3
Various scholars have argued in recent years that bans on mar-
riage by same-gender couples are gender discrimination. 514 Wardle
counters this view by claiming that "heterosexual marriage is the old-
est gender-equality institution in the law." 315
 This statement is
difficult—some would say impossible—to reconcile with the history of
women's subordination explicit in marriage laws until recently." 6
Wardle then goes on to state that " it) he requirement that mar-
riage consist of both a man and a woman emphasizes the absolute
equality and equal necessity of both sexes for the most fundamental
51° See supra Part 11.8.
511 Schneider, The Channelling Function, supra note 1, at 519.
512 Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Address to the Legislature of the State of New York (Febmary 14,
1854). I IlisToRY OF WOMEN'S SUFFRAGE, 1848-1861, at 595-605 (Elizabeth Cady Stanton,
Susan 8, Anthony & Matilda Joslyn Gage, eds., reprint ed. 1985), reprinted in KATHERINE
T. BARTLETT AND ANGELA P. HARRIS, supra note 253, at 57,60.
313 See STRASSER, supra note 7, at 117-20. See generally GLENDON, TRANSFORMATION OF
FAMILY LAW, supra note 2; GRAFF, supra note 55; GROSSBERG, supra note 55; STONE, supra
note 55.
314 see, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Ii3iy Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 197 (1994); Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social
Meaning of Gender; 1998 Wis. L. REV. 187 (1988); see also Christensen, If Not Marriage, supra
note 173, at n.20 (listing scholarship making this argument).
515
 Wardle, Efforts to Legitimate. supra note 19, at 753.
516 See supra Part MB.
314	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 41:265
unit of society."317 Here he seems to narrow the immediately prior
claim that "heterosexual marriage" as a whole "is" a gender equality
institution, and instead to make the seemingly more modest claim
that the man-woman requirement "emphasizes" the "absolute equal-
ity" and "equal necessity" of both sexes. However, this statement is also
problematic. An "absolute equality" between the sexes can not be
"emphasized" if it does not exist in the first place. 318 The idea that
"traditional" marriage "emphasizes" the "equality" of the sexes makes
no sense in view of the history of marriage.m 9 Moreover, the statement
that the man-woman requirement is a way of "emphasizing" the
"equal necessity" of both sexes in society's "most fundamental unit" is
simply a way of restating the requirement. In other words, it says that
the man-woman requirement is a requirement because it is necessary
for the unit. This neither explains nor justifies the requirement it-
self.sw
'Moreover, even if heterosexual marriage is a "gender-equality in-
stitution," this does not mean that marriage by same-gender couples is
not also a gender-equality institution. Some have argued that mar-
riage between two people of the same gender may be more likely to
be a gender-equality institution than heterosexual marriage, in view of
the relative lack of stereotyped gender roles that people may bring to
such marriages. 32 It may be that allowing people of the same gender
to marry will be more likely to further gender equality than the cur-
rent restriction does.322
317 Wardle, Efforts to Legitimate, supra note 19, at 753. •
3.18 See supra note 127.
319 See supra Part II.B.
520 Wardle emphasizes information about lack of male monogamy in committed gay
male relationships as part of his effort to show that seeking marriage is a retreat from it. See
Wardle, Efforts to Legitimate, supra note 19, at 759-60. However, this does not shed light on
what behavior will be if marriage by same-gender couples is allowed. According to Sax IN
AMERICA, "110 matter what [married couples] did before they wed, no matter how many
partners they had, the sexual lives of monied people are similar. Despite the popular myth
that there is a great deal of adultery in marriage, our data and other reliable studies do not
find it. Instead, a vast majority are faithful while the marriage is intact." ROBERT T. MI-
CHAEL ET AL., SEX IN AMERICA: A DEFINITIVE SURVEY 89 (1994). Some reach different
conclusions, however, about the prevalence of adultery. See, e.g., Joan. D. Atwood and
Madeline Seifer, Extramarital Affairs and Constructed Meanings: A Social Constructionist Thera-
peutic Approach, 25 AMER. J. OF FAMILY THERAPY 55 (1997) (estimating 50-60% of married
men and 45-55% of married women engage in extramarital sex at some time during their
marriage).
"I See Stoddard, supra note 309, at 13,14-16. See generally Becker, Women and Morality,
supra note 7.
522 See generally Becker, Itinnen and Morality, supra note 7.
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Wardle also takes an absolutist view of the man-woman require-
ment:
[C]laims for same-sex marriage cannot exist with the belief
that there is an inherent, essential nature of marriage or that
marriage reflects something fundamental and inherent in
the natures of men and women. Nor can the concept that
marriage is ordained by God, and has some absolute fixed,
immutable characteristics, coexist with belief in same-sex
mar riage. 323
While Wardle and others324 believe a certain kind of marriage is or-
dained by God, other religious denominations believe that God wel-
comes marriages by same-gender couples. 325 In a society where mar-
riage is a civil institution,326 it is not sufficient to justify the marriage
exclusion by asserting that God has defined marriage in a certain
way.327
Wardle also claims that marriage by same-gender couples is logi-
cally inconsistent with marriage by different-gender couples:
[C]laims for same-sex marriage logically presuppose a rejec-
tion of traditional marriage because they are based upon
fundamentally incompatible concepts of marriage and hu-
manity .... Inevitably claims for same-sex marriage must
lead to rejection of traditional male-female marriage that is
predicated on an incompatible belief in the inherent natures
of humanity and marriage. 328
323 Wardle, Efforts to Legitimate, supra note 19, at 76.
324
 See, e.g., Finnis, Law, Morality and "Sexual Orientation," supra note 293; O'Brien, su-
pra note 300. See Part N.C. for further discussion of Fluids' arguments.
323 See STRASSER, supra note '7, at 12-13; see also ESKRIDGE, supra note 7, at 193-217
(Appendix: Letters from the Faithful on the Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage) .
3" See supra note 103.
327
 For additional discussion, see infra notes 373-376 and accompanying text. See Baker
v. Vermont, 1999 WL1211709, at *23 (Dec. 20, 1999) (noting that "it is plaintiff's claim to
the secular benefits and protections of marriage that ... characterizes this case"). As Mar-
tha Minow states regarding those who support the view that gay men and lesbians should
be excluded from the privileges of family membership, "Mt will not do ... to support this
view by reference to nature, convention, or even religion. Many religions are themselves
struggling with these questions; sonie are performing marriages for gays and lesbians,
some are ordaining gay and lesbian clergy." Minow, All in the Family, supra note 5, at 284.
3" Wardle, Efforts to Legitimate, supra note 19, at 762. The notion that the man-woman
requirement "reflects something fundamental and inherent in the natures of men and
women" is discussed more fully at infra Part 1V.B.
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Despite his insistence, there is no reason why claims for marriage by
same-gender couples "must lead to a rejection" of "traditional male-
female marriage."329 Same-gender couples who seek to marry in this
society are not thereby rejecting or denigrating "traditional male-
female marriage." It does not diminish the rights or responsibilities of
male-female married couples to allow same-gender couples to marry.
In sum, the effort to broaden access to civil marriage so that gay
male and lesbian couples can marry is simply what it seems to be—an
effort to allow such couples to marry. Calls for marriage reform, and
changes in marriage laws, recur throughout United States and Euro-
pean history. Allowing gay male and lesbian couples to marry does
not affect the rights and responsibilities of heterosexual married cou-
ples and does not entail a rejection of heterosexual marriage.
13. The Argument That Heterosexual Marriage Necessarily Has Greater
Potential for Bentfitting Individuals and Society Than Does Marriage by
Same-Gender Couples
Wardle also argues that there is something inherent in commit-
ted relationships between opposite sex couples that makes such rela-
tionships more important and worth supporting than relationships
between couples of the same gender. He writes "(nlo other compan-
ionate relationship provides the same great potential for benefiting
individuals and society as the heterosexual covenant union we call
marriage and that is why only committed heterosexual unions are
given the legal status of marriage.""° He also claims that "the integra-
tion of the universe of gender differences (profound and subtle, bio-
logical and cultural, psychological and genetic) associated with sexual
identity, constitutes the core and essence of marriage."331 He does not
seem to assert that the purpose of marriage is procreation and that is
why the institution should be limited to persons of opposite genders.
The values of connection and commitment, so important to indi-
viduals and society, have heterosexuality and heterosexual marriage as
neither a necessary nor sufficient condition. People of the same gen-
der engage in "familistic"332 behavior, support one another and oth-
ers, become financially dependent on one another, and so on. The
n9
 Given the historical evidence about changes in the functions, laws, and customs
surrounding marriage, it is not at all clear what, if anything, "traditional male-female mar-
riage" means. See generally GRAFF, supra note 55.
sso Wardle, Efforts to Legitimate, supra note 19, at '749.
531 Id. at 748. .
532 See Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy, supra note 4, at 23-24.
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potential for community involvement and individual fulfillment that
exists for heterosexual couples also exists for same-gender couples.
For example, Margaret F. Brinig, in an article calling for use of the
term "covenant" in the context of marriage, writes that same-sex cou-
ples "can make the permanent commitment and exhibit the selfless
loving and giving required for a covenant."5"
The rewards of being in a couple and being married and the de-
mands serious commitment makes can also be rewards to society. As-
suming that Hafen's statement that "legal marriage is more likely than
is unmarried cohabitation to encourage ... personal willingness to
labor and invest in relationships with other people, whether child or
adult"334 is correct, this counsels for recognizing same-gender rela-
tionships, not for pretending they do not exist. If individuals do not .
plumb the depths of their commitments to each other, society suffers
a loss."5
Wardle's statement that "the integration of the universe of gen-
der differences . . . associated with sexual identity constitutes the core
and essence of marriage" 536 is problematic for a number of related
reasons. First, it assumes that there is a "core and essence of marriage"
and that he knows what that is. 337 Others view the core and essence of
marriage as consisting of love and commitment. 538 Second, it ignores
the historical evidence that marriage is a social and economic institu-
tion whose functions have changed radically through the course of
Western history. 339 Third, it assumes that certain gender differences
are known and universal and tints essentializes gender. Fourth, it is
based on gender stereotyping and ignores the vast variations in gen-
der differences that occur across cultures and among individuals. 340
335 Brinig, supra note 149, at 1600.
Hafen, Constitutional Status, supra note 4, at 486.
355 Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy, supra note 4, at 38-40.
556 Wardle, Efforts to Legitimate, supra note 19, at 748.
337 Elsewhere in the article, Wardle seems to endorse the idea that "marriage is or-
dained by God, and has some absolute fixed immutable characteristics." Id. at 761-62. It
appears from the reference to the integration of gender differences being the core and
essence of marriage, that to him the man-woman requirement is one of the most impor-
tant, if not the most important, of the "fixed immutable characteristics" of marriage.
338 See, e.g.. REGAN, supra note 5, at 120.
339 See supra note 55. Glendon, for example, writes that marriage has evolved to being
an institution now held together primarily by emotional ties as opposed to earlier times
when it was held together primarily by financial and procreative ties, See GLENDON, TRANS-
FORMATION OF FAMILY LAW, supra note 2, at 293.
54° In Baker a Vermont, the state of Vermont advanced this gender integration argu-
ment as a reason for restricting marriage to opposite sex couples. See No. S1009-97 (Vt.
Super. Q. Dec. 19, 1997), slip op. at 15, appeal docketed No. 98-32 (Vt. Jan. 15, 1998). The
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Finally, it ignores differences that might exist along race and class
lines. 341
Lesbian and gay male couples in committed, loving, marital rela-
tionships assert that their relationships are of.great benefit to them-
selves and society. If pressed to compare these relationships with oth-
ers' relationships, they argue that their relationships are in all relevant
senses equivalent to heterosexuals' marriage relationships. Gay peo-
ple and their supporters claim that the potential of a companionate
relationship to benefit individuals and society has to do with the indi-
viduals and their relationship, not with their gender. U2
Wardle asserts that this "functional equivalence" argument is in-
valid because it is "over-inclusive," since "people who are engaged in
incestuous relations" also may argue that their relationships "are func-
tionally equivalent to traditional marriages (and certainly to same-sex
unions) in terms of their preferences and commitments." 343 Compar-
ing the relationships of people who are "engaged in incestuous rela-
tions" with the relationships of same-gender couples is inapt. First,
Wardle never defines "incestuous relations," so it is difficult to know
precisely what kinds of relations he is talking about. As Carolyn Bratt
has noted, "the mere word Incest' triggers strong feelings of revulsion
in most people . . . . Such revulsion stems largely from the confusion
of incest with the sexual abuse of children.""44 Bratt highlights the
important distinction between "state incest statutes as a vehicle for
prohibiting and punishing sexual abuse of minors and state incest
statutes as a marriage prohibition for adults ; "345 while Wardle elides
the distinction.
trial judge found that this was not a strong enough argument for the marriage restrictions
sufficient to survive a 12(b) (6) motion, since it was based on impermissible sex stereotyp-
ing. See id. In the Vermont Supreme Court's recent decision in Baker v. Vermont, this ar-
gument was alluded to but not discussed. Baker v. Vermont, 1999 WL1211709, at *19 (re-
ferring to "state's purported interests in bridging differences between the sexes"). See
generally JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY
(1990).
"I See, e.g., Twila Perry, Alimony, Race, Privilege and Dependency, supra note 128 (noting
that issues of alimony and dependency on average may be very different for black women
than for white women).
342 See supra notes 280-82 and accompanying text.
spa Wardle, Efforts to Legitimate, supra note 19, at 749.
$44 Carolyn S. Bratt, Incest Statutes and the Fundamental Right of Marriage: Is Oedipus Free to
Marry?, 18 FAM, L.Q. 257 (1984).
343 Id. at 258; see also Leigh B. Bienen, Defining Incest, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 1501 (1998)
(discussing history of incest laws and prosecutions).
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Assuming that the "incestuous relations" Wardle is referring to
are instances of sexual intercourse between a father and a minor
daughter, criminal laws cover such situations.346 If Wardle is referring
to marriages that run afoul of state incest restrictions, perhaps there is
ground to challenge some such restrictions. 347 While detailed consid-
eration of the issue of laws against incestuous marriages is beyond the
scope of this article, Carolyn Bratt provides a lengthy explanation as
to why marriage incest statutes do not protect against genetic defects
and argues that many such restrictions do not withstand "objective
evaluation."3" The considerable state-by-state variation in incest-
marriage provisions may confirm this.349 Nonetheless, some incest-
marriage provisions may protect against actual harms. By contrast, no
harms follow, to the participants or to anyone else, from the participa-
tion of lesbian and gay adults in committed, loving, coupled, marital
relationships.330 Thus, to point to the hypothetical example of people
enjoying incestuous relationships does not mean that gay couples'
functional equivalence argument is invalid.
The functional equivalence argument is valid, as shown above.sn
Since family law should value and nurture positive, serious commit-
ments between adults, it should recognize marriage by same-gender
couples.352 If we want to encourage people to have personal commit-
348 Bran 'notes the intrinsically abusive nature of adult-child sexual relationships."
Bran, supra note 343, at 258, Bratt notes that in a random sample of 101 appellate deci-
sions in cases involving claimed violations of criminal incest laws, all involved prosecutions
for sexual intercourse, and 94 cases "involved father-daughter. father-adoptive daughter or
stepfather-stepdaughter relationships." Id. at 257.
347 See Bratt, supra note 344, at 258-60.
ms See id. at 258.
342 For example, in Rhode Island, marrying one's first cousin is allowed. See R.I. GEN.
Laws § 15-1-1 & § 15-1-2 (1996). In Maine, by contrast, one can only marry one's first
cousin if one provides a certificate of genetic counseling. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A,
§ 701(2) (B) (West 1998). There is also tremendous historical variation in what constitutes
incest for marriage purposes. See GRAFF, supra note 55, at 160-68.
3" See, e.g., STRASSER, supra note 7, at 72; Ball, supra note 7, at 1936-42; Perry, Morality
of Homosexual Conduct, supra note 193. As Bartlett notes, "I oppose families based on inces-
tuous relationships because of the high risk such relationships raise for exploitation."
Bartlett, Saving the Family from the Reformers, supra note 96, at 817.
351 See Ball, supra note 7, at 1938; supra notes 181-285 and accompanying text. See gen-
erally ESKRIDGE, supra note 7.
352
 Wardle argues that the principle of tolerance is not a basis for recognizing marriage
by same-gender couples, because marriage is a preferred status which is distinct from a
tolerated status. Wardle, Efforts to Legitimate, supra note 19, at 751-52, eitingHafen, Constitu-
tional Status, supra note 4, at 546-47. Thus, Wardle says, "the claim for same-sex marriage is
not a claim for mere tolerance, but for special preference." Id. However, this reflects a
cramped view of tolerance and a misleading view of marriage restrictions. Given the state's
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meats to others and lead interdependent lives, we should allow civil
marriage by same-gender couples.
C. The Argument that Gay Men and Lesbians Seeking Access to Marriage Are
Repudiating Morality
Wardle states that "it seems inconsistent for gay and lesbian advo-
cates to appeal to one moral value—equality—at the same time as
they repudiate morality (i.e., the traditional moral opposition to ho-
mosexual practices and exclusive preference for sex within hetero-
sexual marriage) as an improper basis for marriage laws."353 The idea
that gay men and lesbians seeking to broaden access to marriage are
thereby "repudiat[ing] morality" is unsupported.
First, as Mark Strasser points out, "same-sex relationships are not
immoral, just as interracial relationships are not immoral, majority
view notwithstanding. Neither type of relationship harms anyone."354
Moreover, the normative value of a committed gay male or lesbian
couple relationship is the same as in a committed heterosexual rela-
tionship. 355
 Second, the use of the term "morality" is not determina-
tive, since arguments based on "morality" have been used to justify
both morality and immorality. 356 There are genuine differences about
what constitutes "morality" regarding sexual behavior, and thus it is
not accurate to accuse people of "repudiating morality" if they are
seeking the right to marry. 357
treatment of marriage (it is a civil institution, there is minimal restriction on entry into it,
there is no requirement of any special living arrangement or financial arrangement, it is
available to people who are sterile and who have no interest in bearing or raising children,
and who have no aptitude for intimacy), it can be argued that forbidding the entry of les-
bian and gay male couples is indeed intolerant. See Wriggins, Questions of Constitutionality,
supra note 7, at 395-96. Moreover, Linda McClain recently argued for a tolerance-as-
respect model, which is violated by banning marriage by same-gender couples. McClain,
supra note 7, at 121. To McClain, allowing such marriage "recognizes the diversity among
persons concerning their conceptions of the good and the intimate relationships they seek
to secure. At a minimum, permitting same-sex maniage accepts the fact of diversity and
properly affords to gay men and lesbians the cultural resources to engage in the exercise
of their moral powers." Id. at 122.
3" Wardle, Efforts to Legitimate, supra note 19, at 756.
354 STRASSER, supra note 7, at 72.
3s5
 See Ball, supra note 7, at 1938. See generally note 193 and sources cited therein.
3s6 See Becker, Women and Morality, supra note 7, at 167. Becker notes that "moral and
religious arguments have supported and opposed violence, slavery, and patriarchy." Id.
357 In Sex IN AMERICA, the researchers found that nearly half of the sample fall in what
the authors called the "relational" category, whose members believed "that sex should be
part of a loving relationship, but that it need not always be reserved for marriage. These
people, who make up nearly half our sample, disagree with the statement that premarital
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Wardle refers to "morality" in this context as "the traditional
moral opposition to homosexual practices and exclusive preference
for sex within heterosexual marriage." 358 This view of "morality" is
similar to, and appears to be based at least in part on, that of the "new
natural law theorists."353 These writers claim to prove, on the basis of
natural law, that "sexual acts are morally right only within mar-
riage."388 John Finnis, for example, writes that for sex acts to be moral,
they must have "unitive significance." 381 He writes that:
sexual acts are not unitive in their significance unless they
are marital (actualizing the all-level unity of marriage) and
(since the common good of marriage has two aspects) they
are not marital unless they have not only the generosity of
acts of friendship but also the procreative significance, not
necessarily of being intended to generate or capable in the
circumstances of generating but at least of being, as human
conduct, acts of the reproductive Idnd.382
Finnis claims that "deliberately contracepted sex" within heterosexual
marriage is not sex of the unitive, moral variety but instead is im-
mora1.383
The new natural law theorists' arguments have been countered
by various scholars, such as Michael Perry,384 Andrew Koppelman,385
sex is always wrong, for example. Most, however, say that marital infidelity is always wrong
and that they would not have sex with someone they did not love." MICHAEL ET AL., supra
note 320, at 233. One-third of the sample fell in the "traditional" category, and said "that
their religious beliefs always guide their sexual behavior that homosexuality is always
wrong ... that premarital sex, teenage sex, and extramarital sex are wrong." Id. at 232-33.
358 Wardle, Efforts to Legitimate, supra note 19, at 756.
3" Andrew Koppehnan refers to the "new natural law theorists" as Germain Grisez,
John Finnis, Gerard V. Bradley, and Robert P. George. Koppelman, Is Marriage Inherently
Heterosexual?, supra note 21, at 52. Germain Grisez is not a legal scholar, but Fluids, Brad-
ley, and George rely on him. For examples of their work, see Finnis, Law, Morality and "Sex-
ual Orientation," supra note 293; Bradley & George, Marriage and the Liberal Imagination,
supra note 293. Patrick Lee has written an article with Robert P. George, and he could be
termed a new natural law theorist as well. See Lee & George, What Sex Can Be, supra note
293.
560 See Lee & George, What Sex Can Be, supra note 293, at 135.
561 Finnis, Lau; Morality and "Sexual Orientation," supra note 293. at 1067; see also Bradley
& George, Marriage and the Liberal Image, supra note 293, at 305.
362 Finnis, Lau; Morality and "Sexual Orientation," supra note 293, at 1067.
363 See id. at 31.
364 See Perry, Morality of Homosexual Conduct, supra note 193.
365 See Koppehnan, Is Marriage Inherently Heterosexual?, supra note 21.
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Carlos Ball, 366 Stephen Macedo,367 and Mary Becket: 368 These scholars
reject the notion that "deliberately contracepted sex" within marriage
is immoral. 369 They also reject the notion that sex between persons of
the same gender is necessarily morally deficient."
Becker responds to the natural law theorists' idea that hetero-
sexuality is inherently morally superior to homosexuality as follows:
IT] he conviction that heterosexuality is inherently morally superior
to homosexuality is difficult to respond to because one either sees the
moral superiority of noncontracepted heterosexual intercourse in
marriage or one does not."371 While Wardle and others see the inher-
ent moral superiority of noncontracepted heterosexual intercourse,
others do not. 372
While the new natural law theorists' arguments are not overtly
based on religion, various scholars have shown that they are religion-
based. Carlos Ball argues, "despite ... protestations, Finnis' argu-
ments depend ultimately on theology-based notions that only sexual
acts which are reproductive in nature can be inherently good." 373
Richard Posner writes that Finnis "expound[s] an Orthodox Catholic
view in a manner incomprehensible to the secular mind."374 Accord-
ing to Koppelman, bans on same-gender marriage should not be
based on the "exceedingly contestable religious surmises" of the new
natural law theorists." It is also significant that some religions besides
566 See Ball, supra note 7.
367 See Macedo, Homosexuality and the Conservative Mind, supra note 293.
366 See Becker, Women and Morality, supra note 7.
369 See Ball, supra note 7, at 1909-19; Becker, WOmen and Morality, supra note 7, at 188;
Koppelman, Is Marriage htherently Heterosexual?, supra note 21, at 58-62; Macedo, Homas4ru-
ality and the Conservative Mind, supra note 293; Michael Perry, Morality of Homosexual Con-
duct, supra note 193, at 43.
57° See Ball, supra note 7, at 1909-19; Becker, Women and Morality, supra note 7, at 188;
Koppehnan, Is Marriage Inherently Heterosexual?, supra note 21, at 58-62; Macedo, Homosexu-
ality and the Conservative Mind, supra note 293; Michael Perry, Morality of Homosexual Con-
duct, supra note 193, at 43.
571 Becker, Women and Morality, supra note 7, at 188.
372 Becker discusses the new natural law theorists' views in greater detail and argues
that keeping marriage closed . to mune-gender couples, particularly lesbian couples, is on
questionable moral grounds for a number of reasons, including that it narrows women's
options. See id.
373 Ball, supra note 7, at 1912,1918 (arguing that new natural law theorists give secular
gloss to traditional but controversial Catholic theology); see also Perry, Morality of Homosex-
ual Conduct, supra note 193, at 66 (noting that Finnis' position defends the "official" view
of the Catholic church but that this is not the position of all Christians or all Catholics).
57.1
	 supra note 152, at 76.
373 See Koppelnian, Is Marriage Inherently Heterosexual?, supra note 21, at 95.
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Catholicism have different views On the issue of marriage between
couples of the same gender; some religions welcome such unions."
Ball, importantly, makes clear that his disagreement with Finnis is
not simply because his arguments' are based in religion or morality:
"Finnis is not incorrect because he incorporates arguments of morality
and the good to defend his position that public policy should dis-
courage homosexual conduct. Instead, Finnis is incorrect because his
arguments are inconsistent, flawed and ultimately unpersuasive."577
The effort to broaden access to marriage, far from repudiating moral-
ity, advances it by endorsing values and aspirations such as commit-
ment, duties, fairness, and caring."
Wardle argues that gay men and lesbians have no basis for dis-
crimination claims with respect to marriage, employment, or other
areas because gay men and lesbians are defined by "sexual behav-
10f."319 Thus, to him, it is incorrect to speak of invidious discrimina-
tion against this group. He states, "the particular sexual behavior that
defines the group seeking same-sex marriage entails uniquely high
risks to public health and jeopardizes sexual integrity and social order
more than most other sexual practices (incest and adultery are the
most comparable behaviors)."38° First, lesbians actually have the lowest
rate of sexually transmitted disease of any sexually active group. 581
Second, the phrase Ieopardiz [ing] sexual integrity" is so vague as to
be mysterious.382 Third, it is not clear what it is about gay sexual be-
havior that "jeopardizes . . . the social order." Is it the fact that gay
male and lesbian couples can not ,get married? Comparing the situa-
tion of gay male and lesbian couples who want to get married with
adulterous sexual activity simply highlights the exclusion from mar-
riage.385
378 See supra notes 324-27 and accompanying text.
377 Ball, supra note 7, at 1912.
378 See REGAN , supra note 5, at 120; Ball, supra note 7, at 1938; Bartlett, Saving the Family
from the Reformers, supra note 96, at 843; Cahn, Review Essay: The Moral Complexities of Family
Lau% supra note 96, at 237; McClain, supra note 7, at 121.
379 Wardle, Efforts to Legitimate, supra note 19, at 756.
58° Id. at 756.
"'Becker, Women and Morality, supra note 7, at 175.
382 Becker might agree that "jeopardizing sexual integrity" is bad, but may have a very
different analysis of what that means. See Becker, Women and Morality, supra note 7, at 170.
Becker argues that alienating, objectifying, autonomy-denying sex is normatively negative,
and that such sex is more. likely in heterosexual relationships than in lesbian relationships.
Thus, she argues, it is bad for women to be restricted to heterosexual marriage. See id. This
illustrates the vagueness of Wardle's statement.
383 For discussion of the incest comparison, see supra notes 344-49.
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Even more important is Wardle's focus on the "sexual behavior
that defines the group."384 Wardle's focus on "sexual behavior that
defines the group" of gay men and lesbians interestingly mirrors the
new natural law theorists' focus on sexual acts outlined above. 385
These opponents of marriage by same-gender couples seem to con-
sider sexual activity to . be of paramount importance. But it is inaccu-
rate to say that lesbians and gay men are defined as unique by their
sexual behavior, since practices such as oral sex are engaged in by
both heterosexuals and homosexuals. 386 Mark Strasser has argued that
sexual orientation is distinct from sexual behavior, 387 and that "sexual
orientation does not merely involve a simple, easily identifiable behav-
ior or tendency to perform such behavior, but instead is a vital part of
one's personality. "588 Defining lesbian couples and gay male couples
seeking access to marriage only or even primarily by their sexual be-
havior is inaccurate and reductionistic. Such a definition ignores the
"familistic" behavior that such couples engage in and overlooks the
benefits of "belonging" that such couples may bring to society. it
would be similarly inaccurate and reductionistic to define heterosex-
ual marriage in a way:that simply focused on "the particular type of
[sexual] behavior that defines the group."389 Marriage is about con-
nection, interdependence and love, not simply sexual behavior.
CONCLUSION
Family law, and the law of marriage and divorce, have to a con-
siderable extent become increasingly focused on individuals and their
rights over the last forty years. Scholarship based on communitarian
ideas has highlighted the trend toward atomism in family law and be-
havior. However, in important ways, the law of marriage has become
more oriented toward mutual duties, and for the first time presents a
384 Wardle, Efforts to Legitimate, supra note 19, at 756.
385 See supra notes 362-63. Craig Christensen has noted that Islay rights opponents
have remained fixated on the sexual aspects of sexual orientation." Christensen, If Not
Marriage?, supra note 172, at 1783.
388 See MICHAEL ET AL., supra note 320, at 140-41.
387 See STRASSER, supra note 7, at 37-38. Strasser notes that it would approach absurd-
ity to suggest that only those who engage in sexual relations with the opposite sex are het-
erosexual. On such an account, individuals who refrained from having sexual relations,
citing health or religious reasons, would seem to be neither heterosexual nor homosexual,
• • Individuals who wait until they marry before having sexual relations have a sexual
orientation even if they have not yet been sexually active." Id. at 37.
388 Id. at 40.
389 Wardle, Efforts to Legitimate, supra note 19, at 756; see Ball, supra note 7, at 1913.
March 20001	 Marriage Law and Family Law 	 325
model of mutual commitment, equality, and interdependence. Ac-
knowledging scholars' concerns about the atomization of law and so-
ciety as significant and in some ways negative, the quest for marriage
by same-gender couples can be seen as clearly positive. It is a striving
toward connection, duty, and responsibility. The opposition to mar-
riage by same-gender couples should be seen as undermining and at-
tempting to sever important connections between people, and in turn
fostering increased atomization. Allowing marriage by same-gender
couples will be a step toward family law's finding "ways to sing more
clearly the melody of belonging."39°
3" Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy, supra note 4, at 42.
